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ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS

THE CONCEPTION OF *FATA* IN THE *AENEID*.

ONE of the crucial questions that can be asked about a poet is: What views does he express concerning the spiritual element of the universe and its action on mankind? What does he conceive to be the relation of man to the powers that produced and condition him? Nowadays all serious poets, except the lyrical, have their powers estimated by the amount of philosophic reflection that their *Weltanschauung*, their theory of the universe, exhibits. Assuming that Virgil did not—nay, could not—write the *Aeneid* without possessing and manifesting some kind of metaphysical system, I shall endeavour in this paper to discover what principles of thought underlie his presentation of the relations of gods and men, and are implicit in his use of the word *fata*.

First let us examine the problem: What was the reality of the gods of the *Aeneid* for Virgil's own beliefs? Could an enlightened poet, who may be presumed to have read the attacks of Plato and Euripides on the anthropomorphism of the Homeric gods, who had read the *De Rerum Natura* and was familiar with other Epicurean and agnostic speculations, believe earnestly that the gods whom he depicted were of moment for the souls of men? Answers may be found in the *Aeneid* to show that the poet was not unconscious of the defectiveness of his gods regarded as worthy objects of whole-hearted reverence.

Speaking in his own person, the poet questions the goodness of the gods in *Aen.* 1. 11, 12. 503, 6. 173. While his gods live on a higher ethical plane than the Homeric gods, yet they do not reach the level of goodness presented by philosophers in the picture of the *sapiens*; as Jupiter himself allows (12. 839), the Romans surpassed even the gods in goodness. Juno certainly is vindictive and spiteful towards Aeneas (1. 11, 27, etc.), and towards Hercules (8. 292); Venus is wheedling (e.g. 8. 387 ff.); Triton is jealous of a human musician (6. 173); Hercules is amorous (7. 659 ff.); Neptune, in demanding a human sacrifice for no reason given, is, at the least, arbitrary (5. 815); Jupiter in especial is vacillating and weakly complaisant (10. 624; 12. 800, 833); he makes a solemn declaration (1. 263), and then goes back upon it or forgets it (10. 8);¹ his prophecy in 1. 271 is inconsistent with that of Anchises in 6. 765, 766; in 10. 107 he says: 'Rex Iuppiter omnibus idem,' but repeatedly thereafter interferes (e.g. 10. 435, 450, 632, 689), while his prohibition is disregarded by Venus (10. 332), Tisiphone (10. 761), Thybris (10. 421), and violated frequently with impunity by Juno and Juturna (in Book XII.). Juno is of opinion that even

¹ Of course some of these defects may be due not to dramatic purposes, but to forgetfulness in the poet.

after Jove has pledged his word, he may be induced to break it (10. 632), and without instigation from another god he does so (11. 725). His reputation for veracity is so uncertain that (to omit as prejudiced the taunts against him of Iarbas in 4. 206 ff.) Palinurus, without incurring any reproach of blasphemy, may say (5. 17) that he would not believe an assurance of safety if it were given by Jupiter himself. Though he in company with Apollo (11. 789) and *fortuna* (8. 534) is called *omnipotens*, his power is limited (9. 6, 94), while his knowledge of the future is circumscribed (4. 227). He is invoked separately by men on only five occasions (2. 689, 4. 206, 5. 687, 9. 625, 10. 668; cf. 8. 572), and on two of them in his limited capacity as sky-god. Was such a figure identified by the poet with the spirit that inly sustains all the furniture of earth and heaven (6. 724 ff.)?

If the answer be 'No,' an inference from these facts is that Virgil kept the figures of the gods, taken from Homer and the earlier Roman annalists but purified, in obedience to the epic convention and to the prejudices of Augustus, who thought he could restore to a generation of scoffers the credulous religion of his ancestors by reviving old rites and externals of belief. Showing a similar deference to religious and literary convention, Horace, Ovid, and Propertius employ the names of the gods, but can impart no sincerity into the employment. In himself Virgil probably was as monotheistic as Plato or Cleanthes. In the *Georgics* he gave the name *Pater* to the spiritual power which worked behind and through the Olympians and through men. In his highest attributes Jupiter is the instrument and representative of the god behind the gods, but he is not to be identified with the spiritual principle of things nor are his utterances of like validity with its decrees.

Now if the portrait of Jupiter in the *Aeneid* is chiefly a concession to convention,¹ prob-

¹ Of Lucretius, who in a similar spirit invoked Venus while denying that the gods interfered with human affairs, Sellar writes: 'Though the ultimate principles of Lucretius are incompatible with a belief in the popular religions of antiquity, his

ably those critics err who see so much spirituality in his functions that they identify *fata* with the will of Jupiter (e.g. Heinze: *Virgils Epische Technik*, p. 286 ff.). That this identification is wrong may, I think, be proved by an examination of the meaning of *fata* in the *Aeneid*. But first let me state briefly what I suppose Virgil's scheme of theology to have been. It was this: There is one supreme and spiritual deity whose decrees are *fata*—inviolable courses of destined events. But the deity has not irrevocably fixed the destiny of every man before his birth. For nations, like Troy and Rome, and individuals, like Aeneas and Dido, there are certain matters of their life which must come to pass; these are actualities determined beforehand in the divine mind, but there are many contingencies which are left to the self-determining human agent.² The instruments of the divine mind are the gods and men. The gods suggest emotions and actions to man, and prompt him in the way of righteousness by their utterances (*fata*, in the first of the meanings noticed below). Man is conditioned in many ways by the (gods of the) earth, sea, sky, etc., i.e., by his environment, but in the greater part of his life he is a free, willing agent; to those events which he has not willed and cannot refer to a known source, natural or supernatural, he gives the loose name *fortuna*, but he knows that this *fortuna* may be part of his destiny.³

The significations of the word *fata* in the *Aeneid* may be arranged in three classes:

mode of conceiving the operation of law in the universe [*fati foedera*, 2. 254] is not irreconcilable with the conceptions of modern Theism.'—*Roman Poets of the Republic*, pp. 342, 343. q.v.

² For a stimulating philosophic statement of this metaphysical position, see Professor W. James's essay, 'The Dilemma of Determinism,' in *The Will to Believe*, p. 181.

³ On this theory the intermediate activity of the gods need not be of great importance to human beings. In the *Aeneid* the only actions of the gods that were evidenced by objective signs were: Book II.: Appearance of the snakes and of fire on Iulus' head. Book V.: The burning of the ships through Iris. Book VII.: The opening of the gates of war by Juno. Book VIII.: The bringing of armour to Aeneas by Venus. Book IX.: The transformation of the ships to sea-nymphs.

1. 'Predictions' uttered by a god (from the root *fa*, cp. 1. 261, 262), whether the predictions be accurate or not. Generally they were correct, because the gods had exceptional powers of learning (1. 20) some of the predestined facts, and when the event predicted was in the counsels of destiny only contingent, the belief held by men in the expediency of the prescribed course of action tended to create its own verification.

2. 'An ordained course of events having happened or about to happen.'

3. In some passages the word seems to share in both meanings.

The first meaning is the root-meaning. The decrees of the supreme power (sometimes mythologically attributed to the Parcae¹) are best known by Jupiter, most often declared by his mouthpiece Apollo, who has other mouthpieces such as Celaeno (3. 250), the Penates (3. 155), the Sibyl (6. 66). These get from men a share of the credit of authorship, though the function of all is merely transmissive. From 8. 627 we see that an artisan god like Vulcan might get information about the future from human seers. Jupiter and any of the gods may be mistaken about details, for these are left to the agency of gods and of men (as in Book V. Neptune of his own will, as it seems, and with the help of Somnus *delapsus ab astris* produced the unexpected effect of the drowning of Palinurus which gives Palinurus a cause of complaint against the accuracy of Apollo, 6. 344), and the purposes of rival gods may thwart one another.

The passages in which *fata* may be interpreted simply as 'the spoken word' are: 1. 205, 237, 257, 261, 299, 382; 2. 121; 3. 444, 700; 4. 110, 225, 340, 440; 5. 656, 703, 709; 6. 45, 67, 72, 147; 7. 239, 255, 272, 293, 583; 8. 12, 133, 476, 499, 512; 9. 137; 10. 67, 154, 417; 11. 112. Total, 35.

¹ It is most unlikely that the Parcae were identified by Virgil with the *Moirai* who, in Aesch. *P.V.* 516, *Agam.* 1026, are spoken of as powers overruling Zeus, for (1) mention of them in the *Aeneid* is rare and insignificant; (2) by art and poetic convention (as in Catullus and Eclogue 4. 47) the idea of them had become too material and unspiritual.

The passages in which *fatum* or *fata* may be interpreted as 'an ordained course of events' are: 1. 222, 546; 2. 34, 246, 294, 433, 506, 554, 653, 753; 3. 345, 494, 717, 4. 20, 519, 651, 678, 696; 6. 376, 449, 466, 511, 546, 683, 713, 759, 869, 882; 7. 50, 79, 314, 594; 8. 292, 334, 731; 9. 94, 648; 10. 35, 113, 380, 471, 501, 624, 740; 11. 287; 12. 395, 507, 676, 726, 795, 819. Total, 51.

The passages in which the word seems to partake of both meanings are: 1. 2, 18, 32, 39; 2. 13, 54,² 257; 3. 7, 9, 17, 180, 337, 375; 4. 14, 450, 614; 5. 707, 725, 784; 7. 120, 224, 234; 8. 398, 574; 9. 134, 204; 10. 160, 587, 701; 12. 149. Total, 30.

With this attempted classification made, let us examine the passages cited to support the identification of *fata*³ with the will of Jupiter. One passage is *Aen.* 1. 260 ff. Venus has reminded Jupiter of the success of Aeneas which he had promised to her. Jupiter replies (257), 'manent immota tuorum | fata tibi . . . (260) neque me sententia uertit.' But the word *sententia* ('my way of thinking') may mean 'my interpretation of data furnished to me' as suitably as 'my [unconditioned] will.' Similarly, in 1. 278, the words 'imperium sine fine dedi' are not incompatible with Jupiter's position as chief executor of *fata*. In 4. 110, where Venus says: 'fatis incerta feror si Iuppiter unam | esse uelit Tyrii urbem Troiaque profectis,' *fatis* means 'oracles,' and Jupiter is to be viewed as intermediary between τὸ θεῖον and mankind; for in 1. 18 the same qualification is expressed by the words 'si qua fata sinant' without mention of Jupiter's wish. In 5. 784 where Venus says of Juno, 'nec Iouis imperio fatiue infracta quiescit,' the

² In 2. 154 *si fata deum, si mens non laeua fuisset*, the alternatives may be (1) the oracles as distinguished from the Trojan interpretation of them (*mens*); (2) the course willed by the gods as distinguished from the Trojan resolve which acted in furtherance of that course.

³ We sometimes read of Jupiter's relation to *fatum*; but the fact that the plural cases of *fata* occur in the *Aeneid* 104 times, while the singular cases occur only 15 times, shows that Virgil had no desire to use the word in the abstract philosophical signification current—e.g. in Cicero's *De Fato*. Lucretius, who seldom uses the word, has a passage (2. 254-257) in which *fatum* and *fata* seem identical in meaning.

meaning probably is: 'Juno is crushed neither by commands of Jupiter [privately expressed as in 10. 606; 12. 791] nor by his [public] predictions of an ordained course of events,' by which other gods are checked, as is Diana (11. 587) and Apollo (11. 794). In 3. 375 Helenus, referring to the fact that Aeneas voyages under auspices higher than human, adds: 'Sic fata deum rex | sortitur uoluitque uices, is uertitur ordo.' The meaning obviously is: 'To this end the king of the gods selects his oracles and rolls the circle of events,' which again is not inconsistent with the amount of free self-determined activity that Jupiter possesses. In 4. 614, '[si] sic fata Iouis poscunt, si terminus haeret,' the words 'fata Iouis' might mean 'utterances'; even if they be taken as meaning 'course of events willed by Jupiter,' we may regard Jupiter as the source, either secondary or ultimate. In 4. 651, in the words 'dum fata deusque sinebant,' there is a conjunction of agents that is hard to explain if *deus* be identified with Jupiter and *fata* with his will; but if the source of *fata* be placed elsewhere than in Jupiter's will, the mention of him or of any other god as intermediary is quite suitable.

Against the identification of *fata* with the will of Jupiter many passages may be adduced. Most decisive, perhaps, are the passages where the decisions of *fata* and of Jupiter or another god are contrasted, e.g. 8. 398, 'nec Pater omnipotens nec fata uetabant'; 3. 395, 'fata uiam inuenient aderitque uocatus Apollo,' and cf. 2. 121, 3. 337, 4. 440, and 8. 334, 574. In 10. 112, Jupiter unambiguously says: 'Rex Jupiter omnibus idem; fata uiam inuenient.' In 12. 725, we have the unhappy literary reminiscence, inserted forcibly into a description of a battle scene which without it runs smoothly, of Jupiter weighing the *fata* of Aeneas and Turnus, although in 1. 793 Jupiter reminds Juno that Aeneas *must* conquer and ultimately become a god¹; one fact emerges from the scene—namely, that the decision of the strife is made by some power other than Jupiter's. In both of these last instances he

in an emergency refuses the responsibility of a decision. That he is conditioned by some other power is shown in 10. 467² where he tells Alcides that he may not interfere to save Pallas, for 'stat sua cuique dies,'³ in 9. 94 ff. he must refuse Cybele's wish, because of *fata*, which have not granted to any god the power she requires. He is by implication included among the gods who on the testimony of a goddess, Iris (9. 6), could not have done what the course of events unaided has done. Though Jupiter may promise vaguely, it is for the Parcae to determine the time of fulfilment (9. 107; 12. 150).

The foregoing instances show that things happen otherwise than Jupiter knows or intends. But Jupiter and the gods are not the only instruments of *fata*. In the *Aeneid* we seem to be presented with other two sources of action—the will of men and the operations of *fortuna*. What is the place of these motor forces in Virgil's scheme?

In the *Aeneid* human beings as agents are only a little lower than the gods; men are subject to the influence of the gods only within the sphere of the contingent. This influence is exerted constantly and in diverse manners. Perhaps Virgil in his attempt to justify the ways of Providence to men, was led too frequently to see supernatural influences, because the materialistic Epicureans of his day denied divine interference in mundane affairs. If in some instances he seems to contrast the operations of the gods with the operations of men, the fact that the supernatural influence is mentioned first shows where the emphasis was put by the poet's thought.

² This passage, a reminiscence of *Il.* 16. 433, shows an instructive dissimilarity from it. In Homer Zeus, while allowing that it is Sarpedon's portion (*μοῖρα*) to be killed, yet thinks about saving him, but is shamed from that by Hera. Jupiter in the *Aeneid* never thinks of violating *fas* or *fata* (only goddesses, Juno and Cybele, dream of that); further, he spontaneously grows indignant because Aesculapius interfered with natural laws (7. 770).

³ But this principle is inconsistent with the ideas in 4. 620: 'cadat ante diem'; 4. 696: 'quia nec fato merita nec morte peribat | sed misera ante diem'; 10. 624, 11. 160, 12. 149 ff., 395.

¹ Cf. also 10. 471-2.

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In 11. 118 we have the idea that men are preserved by a god [or 'God'] or by their own right hand; in 10. 72 that Aeneas could be misled by his own acts, without prompting from a god; in 9. 184 that men may be roused by the gods or by their own passions; in 9. 253 that they are rewarded by the gods and their own character; in 9. 601 that the Trojans were led to Italy by a god or by their own madness; in 2. 237 that Aeneas was called to battle by an Erinys, and by the shouting of men. Space does not allow me to discuss Virgil's theory of causation, shown in these passages, and in others (e.g. 12. 554 and 560, 11. 901), which have been examined by Professor Conway.¹ These appearances and revelations of the gods in the *Aeneid* might be arranged under a scheme such as this: (1) Cases where man unexpectant is affected by the action of the gods; (2) cases where man unexpectant is affected by a revelation in a dream or by an oracle; (3) cases where man expectant is affected by the action of the gods; and (4) cases where man expectant is affected by a revelation in a dream. It will be found that in many cases the action of the gods is the reflection in outward nature of the mood of the man's mind, that divine actions and dreams merely bring to a focus feelings already latent. The men being in the way, the gods led them.² The cases have already been enumerated where the divine working was accompanied by objective signs which would have refuted any scoffer present. The other cases are too numerous to mention here in which the actors have only subjective inferences of the activity of the gods, or are quite unconscious of it, while the reader who can overlook what happens before and behind the scenes alone is aware of the divine purpose. Thus in 4. 128 Juno discloses to Venus her purposes concerning Dido and Aeneas; without this knowledge the reader would not detect any divine working in the results described in 1. 160 ff. Many other instances seem to show that the poet would have us

always be conscious of supernatural influences ('of environment,' in the modern phrase); yet he does not doubt the reality of the freedom of the will. It is worth noting that Aeneas does *not* stand waiting for a sign, as some critics who talk of him being oppressed with a load of *fata* would have us think. In Book I., when the storm breaks, he views it in a quite naturalistic fashion, not appealing to the gods, as the average Roman sailor would certainly have done, but envying his fallen countrymen their quiet death already won. In Book II. he is so full of action that Venus has to recall him to a sense of his duty to his home; when his father refuses to leave Troy, Aeneas in a mad impulsiveness seeks not to argue with him, but is rushing forth to certain death when he is checked by a miraculous sign. All through the poem the gods thrust their favours upon him; like a wise man he uses their guidance, but in action he is prompt and in battle bold almost to the verge of indiscretion. By his own way of thinking (12. 435) his distinguishing marks were not his nearness and dearness to the gods, but his manliness and capacity for endurance.

A question not easy to answer is: What is the place of *fortuna* in this metaphysical scheme attributed to Virgil? If the word *fortuna* were used strictly, it would imply what no theistic writer—and Virgil was such—could allow, namely, that actions unpurposed by God may happen. The idea of *fortuna* denies or fails to recognise the action of an intelligent and conscious Governor of events. But in popular language men spoke of *fortuna* and its effects, though by connecting *fortuna* with *necessitas* (cp. Hor. *Od.* I. 35. 17) they recognised that events were bound by strict laws of causation, and that things which seemed fortuitous were the product of series of causes which stretched beyond the limited vision of man. In *Aen.* 5. 604, the poet, speaking from the standpoint of the Trojans with their limited knowledge says: 'Hic primum fortuna fidem mutata nouauit,' but goes on to explain from the higher ground of poetic belief that the event was caused by Juno, whose evil purpose was turned to good by inscru-

¹ In *Proc. Class. Assoc.*, October, 1906.

² Cf. Bradley, *Shakespearean Tragedy*, pp. 14-15; Raleigh, *English Novel*, pp. 223-225.

table providence. In l. 625 Iris identifies herself with the Trojan women in their feelings when she asks: 'O gens | infelix! cui te exitio fortuna reseruat?' In l. 337 Aeneas says that the storm wrought *forte sua*, but the reader knows how it was brought to pass and why. In l. 127 Aeneas who has been recommended to seek Evander by the Sibyl, Anchises and Thybris, says: 'Optime Graiugenum cui me fortuna precari . . . uoluit.' This at first seems strange, but the following lines show that *fortuna* is loosely used as the equivalent of *fata* (= 'oracles'), for Aeneas mentions the motives that brought him *et fatis egeve uolentem*. *Fortuna* is to be interpreted similarly in the speech of Venus in l. 43 and 49, and of Jupiter l. 107. Compare l. 435 which says of Lausus and Pallas: 'quis fortuna negarat | in patriam reditus with l. 438, 'mox illos sua fata manent maiore sub hoste.' Cp. also 6. 532, 8. 574, 10. 457 ff.; 11. 43, 108, 128, 253, 345; 12. 593, 677, 694. When *fortuna* refers to past or present events, the reader, if not the speaker, always knows the divine purpose

to which the word is loosely or ignorantly applied; when it refers to future events as in 11. 128, spoken by Drances: 'Et te, si qua uiam dederit fortuna, Latino | iungemus regi,' it means in more pious phrase 'if a way be opened up.' Cp. 8. 334 ff., 476-7, 10. 107, 12. 147.

In a few passages Virgil contrasts *casus* and the gods as efficient causes. Here *casus* seem to mean 'spontaneous undeliberated action, arising from the passions.' In 9. 211, 'si quis in aduersum rapiat casusue deusue,' the opposition is between reckless passions in warrior and moral enthusiasm in a patriot; in 12. 321 'incertum . . . quis tantam Rutulis laudem casusne deusne | attulerit,' the opposition is between a foeman shooting at random and wastefully, and a foeman intent on killing some enemy and helped thereto by a god whom he has invoked; in either case the *agent* must be a mortal. Cp. 12. 405, 677.

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A PROPOSED RESTORATION, WITH A NEW INTERPRETATION, OF AESCHYLUS, *Prometheus*, 790-792.

WECKLEIN foists upon me a theory which I distinctly stated I did not accept.¹ In a brief reference to the verses in my account of Io's Asiatic journey I mentioned incidentally the fact that στρέψεις σαύτην in 707 suggested nothing better for 791-792 than στρέψεις σαύτην, and reiterate (p. 20) that such an emendation is to be rejected.

The remedy I now propose for 792 is a simple one: restore the final vowel of περῶσα to its probable owner and πόντον to its original case. Thus, without injury to the body of the text, we thrust the dislocated member into its socket—and secure a sea in Asia to balance the Hybristes River in Europe. The harassed maiden comes to star-grazing mountain and violent river in one continent, must cross level plain and placid sea in the other. Europe's

foaming torrent and 'vast sky-neighbouring mountain of milk snow' are set over against Asia's lakes and boundless plains—τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἡῷ τε καὶ ἡλίον ἀνατέλλοντα πεδίων ἐκδέκεται πλῆθος ἄπειρον ἐς ἄποψιν, says Herodotus, in speaking of the very country which Io must traverse (1. 204) χῶρος πλατὺς καὶ πολλός (4. 39). Whether we write 'placid,' or 'Placid,' is immaterial. Salt Lake is 'salt lake': Ἀφλοισβον Πόντον must be ἀφλοισβον, cannot possess the characteristics of the πολυφλοισβοιο θαλάσσης of Homer with which Aeschylus and his contemporaries were familiar, a sea across which it would be impossible for a mere maiden (which Io is in this play) to swim (περῶσα θάλασσαν πολλήν, Hdt. 4. 43), no matter how feasible a similar feat might appear in myth for a bull of superhuman might in traversing the sea lying between Phoenicia and Crete. The heifer-horned maiden would have no desire to attempt to

¹ In his review of my *Problems in Prometheus* in *Berliner Phil. Wochenschrift*, 29, 1268.

rival that performance; and to ascribe it to the girl before their eyes would be too much for the credulity of even an Athenian audience. However incredible the rest of her journey might seem, it was, at least, on dry land; and if Prometheus warns the maid not to cross the Hybristes (οὐ γὰρ εὐβάτος περᾶν, 718), certainly he would not direct her to cross the tempestuous Euxine (θηριωδεστάτη θάλασσα), as Sikes and Willson imagine. But a more conclusive argument remains. For Io to swim the Black Sea after crossing the strait that separates the two continents is absolutely unnecessary. She is already 'on the other side,' in Asia (735), to reach which she was expressly brought by the poet to the Thracian Bosphorus. Otherwise why cross the strait before plunging into the Pontus for her record-breaking swim, even though it were ἀκόμονος ἐν πόντου πελάγει? Her course is clearly indicated by the fact that she is brought to this βόσπορος ἐπώνυμος. She is to proceed eastward¹ (πρὸς ἀνατολὰς ἡλίου), toward the Caspian, which was called the 'Sea of the Rising Sun,' not southward, towards the region now known to be the source of the Nile.² In that case the poet would have represented her as crossing to Asia at the traditional Bosphorus, and skirting the southern coast of the Euxine, which would have rendered such an unprecedented transit of the Pontus superfluous. Moreover, if she crosses the Euxine, she will never come to the country of the one-eyed folk which is directly in her path; for the Arimaspi live ὑπὲρ Ἰσσηδόνων (Pausan. 1. 24. 6), and the Issedones were located far to the east of the northern Caspian, not east (or south) of the Pontus. Cf. especially Pausan. 1. 31. 2 παραδιδόναι δὲ αὐτὰς Ὑπερβορέους μὲν Ἀριμασποῖς, Ἀριμασποῖς δ' Ἰσσηδόσι, παρὰ δὲ τούτων Σκύθας

¹ The phrase may be used even if the direction is north-east: πρὸς ἡῷ τε καὶ ἡλίον ἀνατολὰς ἐπορεύοτο τὴν ὁδὸν διὰ τῆς Χερσονήσου (Hdt. 7. 58).

² Even the map of Ptolemy, nearly seven centuries later, connected Africa and Asia by land south of Aethiopia; and it is very probable that Aeschylus conceived the Nile as rising far to the east in Asia. Thus Io would arrive at the source by crossing the Caspian. Even Marco Polo's narrative was utterly opposed to what the geographers of his time believed.

ἐς Σινώπην κομίζειν (probably the revised Attic version of the story). All the instructions given by the prophetic god are in simple speech, not in riddles (οὐκ ἐμπλέκων αἰνύματα, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶ λόγῳ (610). And these she is to engrave on the tablets of her mind. When she reaches the ἡπειρον (place), she must go eastward πρὸς ἀνατολὰς (direction), crossing another body of water (stage)—which evidently lies between her and her goal—until she reaches the Gorgoneian plains of Cisthene (limit). This sea can be no other than the Caspian. It lies directly in her track. She cannot escape it; and she must ultimately reach the Red Sea (Indian Ocean), traversing Asiatic Scythia, for she is told to be on her guard against the griffins; and these creatures dwell ἐν τῇ Ἰνδικῇ χώρᾳ (Ctesias, *Exc. Ind.* 12. Cf. Solin. 13 in Asiatica Scythia grypes tenent universa). Aethiopia is in the south, Scythia in the north (Strabo, 33). The Indian Ocean lies east and south of the Caspian: τὰ πρὸς ἡῷ τε καὶ ἡλίον ἀνατέλλοντα, ἐνθεν μὲν ἡ Ἐριθρή παρήκει θάλασσα, πρὸς βορῶν δὲ ἡ Κασπίη τε θάλασσα καὶ ὁ Ἀράξης ποταμὸς ῥέων πρὸς ἡλίον ἀνίσχοντα (Hdt. 4. 40). Io, then, proceeds over the level plain, north of the Caucasus (τὴν κατέπερθε ὁδὸν ἐν δεξιῇ ἔχοντας τὸ Καυκάσιον οὖρος), like the Scythians who likewise came ἀπὸ τῆς λίμνης τῆς Μαυρίτιδος (Hdt. 1. 104), not along the rocky coast of the Euxine to the south; and, consequently, she must come to the Caspian, which extends north and south for seven hundred miles, like a broad river, directly in her path. If Aeschylus did not know all the geological and geographical facts which modern science has furnished, what matter? He must have known that the inland sea was there (just as much of the geographical knowledge which was generally supposed to be brand new in the nineteenth century was really in possession of the medieval traveller), and he had to represent it in such a way that it would answer to the demands made on him by the exigencies of his narrative. And being on the verge of that land of darkness beyond the bounds of human knowledge, peopled with phantasmagoria and monstrosities, he could take certain liberties with the facts in his

description of the physical features of the dimly known sea. He tells his audience that the sea is ἀφλοισβος, and there is an end of it. It is a silent, mysterious, misty Mummelsee, not Byron's 'Aegean that lulls his chafed breast from elemental war.' There is something uncanny in this circumstance alone—a surgeless sea was unknown to the Greek, who was accustomed to look upon the ruffled surface of the Mediterranean Archipelago—and it prepares us for the entrance into that region of distortion, which is mentioned in the next breath. The outlook of the inhabitants of the countries at the other end of the Mediterranean twenty centuries later was precisely the same. Beyond the luminous zone of the Portuguese mariners lay the 'Sea of Darkness,' as it was called—οὔτε πέμφιξ ἡλίου προσδέρκεται | οὔτ' ἄστερων ὄμμα Λητώας κόρης (Aesch. *Fr.* 170). Columbus believed that Quinsay, the great city of Cathay, was not more than 6,500 miles from Spain. His knowledge was gained largely from such books as the *Imago Mundi*, which was but a compilation of the teachings of the ancients. The coast line of Cathay lost itself in impenetrable swamps, according to Ptolemy. Routes were marked which no man had ever travelled. Map-makers were in advance of explorers. Everything reported by legend was set down—and the traveller was expected to find each point. The terrors of the unexplored sea of the Portuguese were similar to those which Prometheus portrayed to Io. Far to the south was the 'fiery zone' (which Aeschylus places in the east), where Gorgons and Hydras had their habitations (they were located in the west by Hesiod, in the east and south by others), and steaming gulfs ready to swallow up the luckless crew. All these were sketched upon the charts to warn away the reckless. And when the weeds of the Sargasso Sea thickened about the *Pinta*, we are told that the unhappy seamen dreamed of a region where all progress would be stopped. Similar stories were brought back home by the ancient mariners who ventured far from home: τὸ πλοῖον τὸ πρόσω οὐ δύνατ' ἔτι εἶναι προβαίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐνίσχυσθαι (Hdt. 4. 43). Aeschylus

may not have obtained information about the salt marshes of Central Asia; he simply places the ἀφλοισβος πόντος in Io's path. And it is just here, Aulus Gellius informs us (9. 4), that those scriptores veteres non parvae auctoritatis, such as Aristaeus Proconnesius, Isigonus, Ctesias, Onesicritus, Philostephanus, and Hegesias located the very monsters of which Prometheus bids Io beware; for in 'libri Graeci miraculorum fabularumque pleni' were 'res inauditae, incredulae. . . . Scythos illos penitissimos, qui sub ipsis septentrionibus aetatem agunt. . . . ἀνθρωποφάγους nominari; item esse sub eadem regione caeli unum oculum in frontis medio habentes, qui appellantur Arimaspi.' Cf. Hdt. 4. 27 τοὺς μονοφθαλμοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τοὺς χρυσόφύλακας γρῦπας. . . . Ἀριμασπῶν. Aeschylus probably did not know that the Caspian in one place was almost shallow enough to wade across; that the upper part was frozen over during the whole winter (hardly to be conceived by a people who live on the shores of the πολυφλοίσβου Aegean, though Herodotus says (4. 28) ἡ δὲ θάλασσα πῆγνυται καὶ ὁ Βόσπορος; or that all the forty mouths of the Araxes but one empty into marshes and lagoons (forming an actual πόντος ἀφλοισβος, a dismal swamp of the Germelshausen type): στόμασι δὲ ἐξερείγεται τεσσαράκοντα τῶν τὰ πάντα πλὴν ἐνὸς ἐς ἑλεᾶ τε καὶ τενάρεα ἐκδοῖ (Hdt. 1. 202):

'From the Aralian estuaries,
Or some froze Caspian reed-bed.
For many a league
The shorn and parcell'd Oxus strains along
Through beds of sand and matted rushy isles.'
MATTHEW ARNOLD, *Sohrab and Rustum*.

Aeschylus simply creates a sea devoid of sounding surge, beyond the ken of the Athenian, whose world extended ἀπὸ τοῦ Πόντου μέχρι Σαρδοῦς (Ar. *Vesp.* 700).

And here let us note that 'φλοίσβον, after all, is not a thing of sight. In Homer the word always refers to the battle din. It is never found in the *Odyssey* (where, of all poems written in the Greek language, we should expect the word in this supposed Aeschylean sense), but only in the epic of war and of tumult; and here it regularly expresses the idea which would be rendered

in the Attic of Aeschylus by *ταραχή, θόρυβος*. The only word of the *φλοῖσβος* type which Homer applies to the sea is *πολυφλοῖσβοιο*, which is, as the scholiast says, *ὄνομα πεποιημένον*. And the assumed Aeschylean *ἄφλοισβος* would thus be formed after the analogy of this Homeric mimetic adjective. The noun *φλοῖσβον* appears nowhere else in Aeschylus. Nor does Euripides use the word. Furthermore, I have not been able to find it elsewhere in classical Greek poetry or prose, except in a fragment of Sophocles (438), where we are told that the game of draughts was invented by Palamedes for the warriors at Troy *φλοῖσβον μετὰ κόπον καθημένους*—hence merely a Homeric reminiscence. Much later the obscure and academic Lycophron furnishes us with one example, *φλοῖσβων δίναις* (379) and five hundred years later we fish up *φλοῖσβος ἰλνούς* out of the mud of Oppian's tract *On Fishing*.

But the sentence still lacks a leading verb: and, whatever it is, the word must connote the idea *go*. Just below the poet gives a similar command in a similar context (810) and uses a verb which is singularly expressive at this stage of Io's journey: *ἔρψ' ἔως ἂν ἐξίκη*. If the same word was employed here before *ἔς τ' ἂν ἐξίκη*, it could come only after *ἀντολάς*. In the *Prometheus Unbound* similar instructions are given to Heracles: *εὐθεῖαν ἔρπε τήνδε* (Fr. 195). It has occurred to me that it is precisely in this part of 791 (790, 792, and the first metron of 791 are out of the question) that the missing verb is to be located—in other words, somewhere in the last two metra, now occupied by two *ἄπαξ λεγόμενα*. If so, we avoid the necessity of assuming a lacuna, to which editors too often resort, as *e.g.*, before 970, where both the context and the idiom compel us to take *τοὺς ἰβρίζοντας* as the subject, not the object of *ἰβρίζειν*, in spite of Wecklein's 'kann man nicht beipflichten.'

In 253 the poet writes *φλογωτὸν πῆρ* and in 498 *φλογωπὰ σήματα*. Why should he coin *φλογώψ* in 791? Why coin also *ἡλιοστιβεῖς* to fill out the verse? This part of the sentence is, at least, a proper place for investigation, if we are to restore the lost verb. The epithet *ἡλιοστιβεῖς* is

variously translated: *ab sole perlustratus* (Dindorf), *suntrodden* (L. & S.), 'where are the paths of the sun' (Jebb). In Soph. *Ai.* 670 we find *νιφοστιβεῖς* (*χειμῶνες*), 'winters with snowy paths.' Similarly *φλογοστιβεῖς* would seem to be more appropriate with *ἀντολάς* than *ἡλιοστιβεῖς*. The *ἀνατολαί* are *φλογοβαφεῖς*. All the ways are 'lightened,' not darkened. One who has been on the Aegean and has seen the sun burnishing the glassy surface of the sea into flame-coloured gold, knows that *φλογοστιβεῖς* is just as applicable to southern *ἀνατολαί* as *νιφοστιβεῖς* to northern *χειμῶνες*,

'As when the golden sun salutes the morn,
And having gilt the ocean with his beams.'

Tit. *Andron.* 2, 1.

χθόνα | 'Ἥλιος ἀνίσχων χρυσέα βάλλει φλογί
Eur. Fr. 771.

The allusion is probably not to the paths made by the sun 'checkering the eastern clouds with light' (*Rom. and Jul.* 2. 3) or to 'the bright track of his fiery car' (*Rich. III.* 5, 3), but to the Morgenröte, to 'the dawn, in russet mantle clad,' which 'walks o'er the dew of yon high eastern hill' (*Hamlet* 1. 1). Cf. Soph. *O. T.* 301 οὐράνιά τε καὶ χθονοστιβῆ, Aesch. *Suppl.* 1000 κνώδαλα πετροῦντα καὶ πεδοστιβῆ, *Sept.* 844 τὰν ἀστιβῆ 'Απόλλωνι, Soph. *O. C.* 126 ἀστιβεῖς ἄλσος, *Ai.* 657 χῶρον ἀστιβῆ. The paths of the east are lit up *ἡλίον φοιβῆ φλογί* (*Prom.* 22)—θερμῇ δ' ἀνακτος φλόξ ὑπερτέλλουσα γῆς καίει τὰ πόρρω (Eur. Fr. 772, Nauck).

Moreover, *ἀνατολαί* is always coupled with *ἡλίον* (or *ἄστρων*) in classical authors, is never used alone. If, now, *ἡλιο* has dislodged *φλογο*, we have a locus for *ἔρπε* after—and only after—*ἀντολάς*: *ἔρψ' ἡλίον φλογοστιβεῖς*. Whether this is what Aeschylus actually wrote it would be rash to affirm; but it is at least plausible. The human *ὄψις* is rapid, restless, and inaccurate, as proof-readers can attest; and the eye of the scribe, assisted by his mental ear, could easily have transformed *φηλιονφλογοστιβεῖς* into *φλογοφηλιονστιβεῖς*. Cf. Eur. *Hērkl.* 331 ἐκ τῶν γὰρ αἰσχυρῶν ἐσθλά, and the variant ἐκ τῶν γὰρ ἐσθλῶν αἰσχυρά. The eye never proceeds from one end of the verse to the other evenly, but always fixes the gaze on one spot and then jumps to another, to take

in the next group of syllables within the range of the focus, so that there is a series of jerky leaps from the first foot to the sixth. And sometimes the mind, as well as the eye, o'erleaps itself. Both sight and sound and sense anticipate—a sort of visual-mental prolepsis—*φλογο* is taken before it should be taken, and supplants *φηλιον*. Or, perhaps, the change from *ἡλιονφλογοστιβεις*

is to be accounted for by contraction into *ἡλιοστιβείς* (the syllable *φλογ* dropping out); and a subsequent restoration of the metre is made by a transformation of *ἐρπ*, preceded by *φλογ* (possibly assisted by *φλο* in *φλοῖσβον* directly below) into *φλογῶπας* (from *φλογερε*—*φλογωπε*), to agree with *ἀντολάς*.

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ΟΣ ΑΝ ΠΕΠΛΗΓΗ (*Aves*, 1350).

My reviewer in the *Berliner Phil. Wochenschrift* (December 26, 1908) ranges himself with the opposition: 'Sehr eigentümlich ist die Annahme Harrys, dass Aristophan. *Av.* 1350 *πεπλήγη* ein redupliziertes Präsens oder ein reduplizierter Aorist sei. Eben sowenig gerechtfertigt erscheint es, wenn er *τετρίχοιεν* als reduplizierten Aorist auffasst.' But it is a question of truth, not of authority.

In the first place, the perfect active of the verb *strike* is not *πέπληγα*—the periphrasis *πληγὰς δεδωκέναι* is used by Dem. 54. 14, while *πεπληγέαι* in Xen. 6. 1. 5 does not count. The indicative does not occur at all. In the second place, *πεπλήγη* is not even a perfect in form, not to speak of time. The lines of demarcation between the tenses often get hazy as soon as the indicative is left behind—*εἶμι* is not always future even in Attic, *ἦκω* not always perfect. Veitch is right in asserting that the subjunctive and optative of the latter seem to be used aoristically; Jebb is right in believing that *ἦκοι ἄν* can be parallel to *μένοιμ' ἄν*, for there is nothing to prevent the *detached* form from being used as a possible present or aorist, just as *εἴη ἄν* can be *would be*, *will be*, *shall be*, *must be*, or *will have been*, *must have been*, etc. Only it happens that there are but two examples of *ἦκω* in the optative with *ἄν* in the third person, one in the second, and none in the first. The first two happen to retain the perfect signification whereas *ἄν ἦκοις* (Eur. *Bacch.* 1380) is future in act as well as in verification.

It is conceivable that Aristophanes would not have hesitated to use the reduplicated form to express vividly the image of re-

peated blows. But it is better to consider *πεπλήγη* as an archaic form, purposely employed to give the clause a comic legal colouring—'whoever "mayhems" (maims) his father'—and not, as has been asserted (*C.R.* 19. 440), 'distinctly denotes completeness of the action.' It is, consequently, to the antique field we must go, to study the form in its native environment. One extremity of *πεπλήγη* sounded to the Greek ear the subjunctive mood; but the corpus itself, with the other extremity, gave no information as to tense: present, aorist, and perfect were all *πεπληγ-*. The perfect **πέπληγα* yields *πεπληγνύα* (κ 238). So *κεκληγώς*, *κέκληγα* (μ 256, Δ 343); but present in M 125 (*κεκλήγοντες*) and Π 430 (*κλάζοντε . . . ὡς οἱ κεκλήγοντες*). Cf. B 222, P 88, Callimachus, *Iou.* 53 (*πεπλήγοντες*), σ 335 (*κεκοπῶς χερσὶ στιβαρῆσιν*), B 264 (*πεπληγὼς ἀγορήθεν ἀεικέσσι πληγῇσιν*). So *ὁ πεπληγὼς* (active) = *ὁς ἄν πεπλήγη* = *ὁ πεπλήγων*. Cf. N 60 *κεκοπῶς*, 'Perfektbildung präsensischer Bedeutung' (Ameis-Hentze). In E 762 *πεπληγνύα* is perfect in form, but *πεπλήγετο* in M 162 (=ν 198, O 397) is aorist. Cf. Ψ 363 *πέπληγον* (=θ 264), 660 *πεπληγμένον* (=Π 728), E 504 *ἐπέπληγον*, Σ 31 *πεπλήγοντο*. In Plut. *Mor.* 79 E *ὁ πεπληγὼς* is passive. The regular form *πεπληγμένος* occurs in Diodor. *Sic.* 17. 117. 2. Both active and passive aorists are found in Soph. *Ant.* 171 ff. *παίσαντές τε καὶ πληγέντες*, and in Lys. 4. 15 *πότερον ἐπλήγην ἢ ἐπάταξα*;

But, after all, why should the perfect in such a sentence be desiderated? The Law's command on earth would be *τὸν πατέρα μὴ τύπτε* (*Av.* 1364. Cf. *Ran.* 622), or *μὴ πατάξῃς*, for *πῶς γένουτ' ἄν πατέρα*

τύπτειν ἐν δίκη (*Nub.* 1333), but among the birds οὐκ αἰσχροὺς τὸν πατέρα τύπτειν (*Av.* 757), and whoever commits the deed, ὅς ἂν τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ, οὐ δίδωσι δίκην, or as Socrates put it in the *Nubes*, τί δρῶς, ἦν τις σε τύπτῃ; and Strepsiades answers τύπτομαι. Change this to the relative and we get ὅς ἂν τύπτῃ, which contains too ordinary a verb for the high and mighty Lex, and the comic poet proceeds straightway to transform it into πεπλήγῃ, which smacks of the court. Cf. *Ecl.* 642 οὐκ ἐμελ' οὐδὲν | τῶν ἀλλοτριῶν, ὅστις τύπτει· νῦν δ' ἦν πληγέντος κτέ, *Lys.* 162 εἰδὼν δὲ τύπτωσιν, *Dem.* 23. 50 ἂν τις τύπτῃ τινά . . . ἂν τις ἀποκτείνῃ . . . ἂν τις καταβλάψῃ

τινά—one would search the literature in vain, from Homer to Justinian, to find a perfect subjunctive such as Veitch, Rutherford, La Roche, Sonnenschein, and Tolkiehn would have us believe Aristophanes used in *Aves*, 1350.

As I was not discussing the passage when I wrote the article, and had no occasion to thumb the commentaries (taking it for granted that everybody understood πεπλήγῃ as I did), Kock's note did not fall under my eye: 'nicht Perfect, sondern Conjunctiv des epischen Aoristus.'

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NOTES

HESIOD AND THE DOMINIONS OF AIAS.

MR. ALLEN in *Classical Quarterly* iii. 83-4 founds far-reaching combinations on a fragment of Hesiod, *Berlin Papyri* 10568. The Megarians, he says, who are unknown to Homer, 'found less resistance in Hesiod . . . they are duly seated, equipped with their heroic epithet, among Ajax's possessions. . . . He (Hesiod) has given the Megarians what they in vain sought from Homer, an heroic existence under the banner of Ajax. To glorify Ajax's state, the complaisant Hesiodean enriched him at the expense of his compeers; Troezen, Epidaurus, Aegina, Mases, Hermione and Asine are taken from the kingdom of Argolis; Corinth is filched from the King of Men.'

Now let us look at the text:

Αἴας δ' ἐκ Σαλαμείνους ἀμώμητος πολεμιστής
μνάτο· δίδου δ' ἄρα ἔδνα ἰοικότα, θαυματὰ
ἔργα·
οἱ γὰρ ἔχον Τροίηνα καὶ ἀγχίαλον Ἐπί-
δανρον
νῆσόν τ' Αἰγείναν Μάσητά τε κούροι Ἀχαιῶν,
καὶ Μέγαρα σκυῖοντα καὶ ὀφρυνόεντα Κόρινθον,
Ἑρμιόνην Ἀσίνην τε παρέξ ἅλα ναιετάσας,
τῶν ἔφατ' εἰλίποδός τε βόας καὶ ἵφια μῆλα
συνελάσας δώσειν, ἐκέκαστο γὰρ ἔγχεϊ μακρῶι.

Is there a single word here to range any country but Salamis under 'the banner of Ajax'? Or are we to say that the Sheriff of Nottingham existed heroically 'under the banner' of Robin Hood? Mighty man of war that he is, Aias undertakes by way of providing his bride-price what would in fact be a 'marvellous achievement,' a complete 'drive' of the flocks and herds of every country within raiding distance of Salamis—with the notable exception of Attica. As a business-like and benevolent king, he will furnish his marriage settlement at the expense not of his subjects but of his neighbours, 'taxing the foreigner' by a fiscal process which leaves no possibility of dispute as to the real incidence of the impost.

Even if the explanatory ἐκέκαστο γὰρ ἔγχεϊ μακρῶι left any doubt as to the nature of the 'drive,' the word συνελάσας would suffice; what it implies is clear enough from A 154:

οὐ γὰρ πῶ ποτ' ἐμὰς βοῦς ἤλασαν οὐδὲ μὲν
ἵππους,

and A 677:

ληϊδα δ' ἐκ πεδίου συνελάσσαμεν ἤλιθα πολλήν.

A king who raises contributions from his own people is said δημόθεν ἀγείρειν, τ 197.

But such an irregular financial resource, easy though it is, exposes a king to the brand of δημοβόρος, A 231. In the face of Nestor's story in A 670 ff., it can hardly be maintained that cattle raids between neighbours were unusual in Homeric Greece.

In fact, the only conclusion which we can draw from this fragment as to Aias' political position is that he was on particularly friendly terms with Attica. This is entirely consonant with the Homeric Catalogue, B 558, στῆσε δ' ἄγων ἴν' Ἀθηναίων ἴσταντο φάλαγγες.

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JASON AS 'DOLOMEDES.'

In the first edition (Venice, 1568) of the *Mythologiae Libri Decem*, Natalis Comes writes (VI. 8):

verum cum adoleuisset Iason, a Chironeque medendi artem didicisset, Iason vocatus fuit. Exiuit igitur, e.q.s.

In a revised and enlarged edition (Venice, 1581) the author adds, after *Iason vocatus fuit*, the words, *cum prius Dolomedes nominaretur*. This name, Dolomedes, is not supported by any other authority.¹ Hence, in view of the fallibility of Natalis Comes,²

¹ Recent handbooks of mythology throw no new light on the matter (Gruppe, *Gr. Myth. u. Rel.*, p. 545 n. 2; Seeliger in Roscher's *Lex.* 2. 1. 64).

² The trustworthiness of Natalis Comes is impeached by Joseph Scaliger (*Epis.* 309: homo futilissimus) and Huet (*De claris interpretibus* 8. 5: verborum quippe et characteris securus, vix obtinet sententias). For an example of error, compare *Schol. Apoll. Rh.* 4. 86:

ὁ δὲ τὰ Ναυπακτικὰ πεποικίως ὑπὸ Ἀφροδίτης φησὶ τὸν Αἰήτην κατακοιμηθῆναι ἐπιθυμήσαντα τῇ αὐτοῦ γυναικὶ συγγενέσθαι δεδειπνηκότων παρ' αὐτῷ τῶν Κόλχων καὶ κοιμωμένων διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τὴν ναῦν ἐμπρῆσαι

δὴ τότε ἄρ' Αἰήτη πτόθον ἐμβαλε δὲ Ἀφροδίτη Εὐρυλύτης φιλότῃτι μνησμεναι ἦς ἀλόχοιο, κηδομένη φρεσὶν ἦσαν ὅπως μετ' ἄεθλον Ἰήσων νοστήσῃ οἰκόνδε σὺν ἀγχεμάχοις ἐτάροισιν.
ὁ δὲ Ἰδμων συνῆκε τὸ γεγονός καὶ φησι
φενγόμεναι μεγάροιο θοὴν διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν,

with *Mythol.* (1581) VI. 8: Fugit autem noctu (uti dictum est) cum Argo naui Iason e regione Col-

we may assume that the name arose from an error in his interpretation of *Schol. Apoll. Rh.* 3. 26. He seems to have made the expression σχέτλιε παῖ δολόμηδες refer to Jason.

Braun³ supposes that the Frankfort edition of 1584 reads, *cum prius Diomedes nominaretur*; and Jahn,⁴ though taking exception to other points in Braun's argument, does not call this in question. But among the copies to which I have had access,⁵ the Geneva edition of 1651 is the earliest that has the reading *Diomedes* (p. 582). As this edition abounds in misprints (e.g., p. 583: *Prixi* for *Phrxi*, *Dedonea* for *Dodonaea*, *Sulis* for *Solis*, *Alaum* for *Aglauum*), it is probable that *Diomedes* is an unwarranted substitution for *Dolomedes*. The Lyons edition of 1653, which also has *Diomedes*, is evidently based on this Geneva edition (cf. p. 583: *Phrxi*, *Dodonea*, *Sulis*, *Alaum*).

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NOTE ON MENANDER'S EPITRE-PONTES, 192.

THE gaps in this verse have been filled out in various ways, but as yet no reading has been suggested which is at the same time faithful to the traces in the papyrus and unobjectionable on grounds of language and metre.

For those who have not access to the Cairo manuscript, the basis of emendation must be Körte's second collation, which reads:

ΗΜΟΙΑ ΟΙ . . ΠΑΡΕΧΩΣΩΝ.

chorum, illud consilium suggerente Venere, veluti testatur Idmon in his:

ὑποθῆκ' Ἀφροδίτη
φενγόμεναι μεγάροιο θοὴν διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν,
e.q.s. 'Idmon' appears in the catalogue of authors cited in the *Mythology*.

³ *Bull. d. Inst.*, 1838. p. 13.

⁴ *Arch. Zeit.* 12 (*Denkm. u. Forsch.* 6) 1854, 208.

⁵ Venice 1568, 1581, Frankfort 1581, Paris 1583, Frankfort 1584, [Geneva] 1596, Lyons 1602, 1605, Geneva 1605, Paris 1605, Padua 1616, Geneva 1620, Padua 1637, Geneva 1651, [Lyons] 1653, French translations: Lyons 1607, Rouen 1611, Paris 1627.

ὅς is the natural supplement of the δ, as ἀντῷ is of the -ωι, and the most obvious connective between the two verbs would be a final particle such as ὥς or ἵνα. It is quite possible that we have here a case of transposition similar to Heros *Hyp.* 1; *Samia*, 52, 203, 244. If this is so, the reading of the papyrus was

ΔΟΣΑΥΤΩΙΩΣ,

and we should alter to

ἡ μοι δός, ὥς ἀντῷ παρέχω ὧν.

The one objection to this correction is that ὥς = ἵνα does not occur in the extant fragments of Menander, as represented by Körte's *Index Verborum* and Kock's *Fragments*. But this use of ὥς occurs in Aristophanes' *Birds*, 1509, and is possible for Menander.

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REVIEWS

MODERN GREEK FOLKLORE AND ANCIENT GREEK RELIGION.

Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion: A Study in Survivals. By JOHN CUTHBERT LAWSON, M.A. 8vo. Pp. xii + 620. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1910.

MR. LAWSON'S admirable book is the outcome of two years' tenure of a Craven Studentship, supplemented by the somewhat scanty leisure of ten subsequent years spent in working over the material acquired. The result is well worth waiting for. Mr. Lawson's book is indeed an almost ideal outcome of the Fund, a piece of work that could only be done by long residence on the spot, in remote Greek islands and mainland villages, and that sheds real and definite light on things not only older but greater than the actual facts examined.

Quite avowedly, and, as we shall presently see, inevitably, the self-imposed limitation has its drawbacks. Mr. Lawson's work is a *Study in Survivals*; he rejects deliberately the Comparative Method. Out of modern Greece, and modern Greece only, he will elucidate ancient Greek religion. Under a thin veil of Christianity, paganism is still alive and active. To the modern Greek, as to the ancient, God is not a spirit, He is a magnified man. When it thunders, 'God is marrying his daughters,' ὁ Θεὸς παστρένει τὰς θυγατέρας του—a large expenditure of gunpowder with an attendant deafening din being to the modern Greek the natural utterance of joy.

It is not the religion of the educated, thinking ancient that Mr. Lawson will elucidate. That religion we already know; it is embodied for us in Æschylus, in Pindar, in Euripides, in Plato. It is the religion of the common man in antiquity, the sort of thing that Pausanias found lingering on in Arcadia, that art and literature fail to embody and that lives on in folklore and folk-custom to-day. And be it observed this fond of pagan and primitive thinking lasts on with but little modification through centuries of development from within and conquest without. Moreover—and this for the classical scholar is the cardinal point—however alien it may seem to us, this primitive way of thinking is the stuff of which poetry and philosophy is to a large extent made.

A definite instance will show best the strength of Mr. Lawson's strictly local *non-Comparative Method*, and, we regret to add, its weakness. We select what is perhaps the ablest and most original section in a book that teems with suggestions—the discussion of the Centaurs.¹

Scarcely less widely known among the modern Greek peasants than the Nereids are a class of monsters known as Callicantzari

¹ I select this instance in part for a personal reason. In the light of Mr. Lawson's discussion I now see that the account I have given of the Centaurs and Satyrs, in my *Prolegomena*, pp. 380-389, in which I largely follow Prof. Ridgeway, is inadequate and to some extent misleading.

(Καλλικάντ(α)ροι). They are of shifting shapes and attributes, and their name has many local variations. They are usually gigantic but sometimes pigmies, covered with a coat of shaggy hair though a bald variety is known, they have the legs and ears of goats and asses, are often ithyphallic, they have long thin tails, they are sometimes deformed and lame but always amazingly swift, they are full of greed and lust, a terror to women. In a word, they have all the characteristics that the ancients attributed to Satyrs, Seilenoi, and Centaurs. The name Cantzari, with its euphemistic prefix, Mr. Lawson shows by a long and minute analysis is clearly a survival of the enigmatic κένταυροι, so long a crux to philology. Once pointed out, such is the obvious identity of form and content, word and meaning, that it seems almost incredible that Mr. Lawson should have been the first to detect it.

The reason is that previous investigators have been hide-bound by classical tradition. We know the Centaurs as monsters equally compounded of horse and man of the type familiar in the metopes of the Parthenon. We do not think of them as grotesque monsters of shifting shapes. A modern peasant is less narrow. When shown a grotesque and bestial statuette from the Cabeirium, or the statuette of a Satyr, or of a Centaur, he identifies each and all as Καλλικάντ(α)ροι. The Callicantzari—and this is where modern belief helps our understanding of ancient faith—may appear without so much as a cloven hoof to distinguish them from ordinary mankind. In one place they are described as ἀγριάνθρωποι, savages but human in appearance, while in another they are ἄγρια τετράποδα savage quadrupeds.

To Homer¹ the Centaurs were Φῆρες dwelling on Mt. Pelion.

ἤματι τῷ ὅτε φῆρας ἐτίσας λαχνήεντας
τούς δ' ἐκ Πηλίου ὤσε.

To Pindar² the good Centaur Cheiron was φῆρ θεός. Of this Prof. Ridgeway³

gives an explanation purely ethnological. The Pheres, he holds, are in Homer 'nothing more than a mountain tribe, not yet conceived as half horse half man.' The name *Pheres* was, according to Prof. Ridgeway, given to the Centaurs by their enemies who conquered yet dreaded them, who gave them an opprobrious name 'beasts' yet feared them for their supposed magical arts. This theory contains, I think, some but by no means the whole truth, and here Mr. Lawson joins issue. The Centaurs, according to him, got their name of 'Beasts' and their Beast-form, not from the odium of their enemies, but from their magical power of assuming the shape of beasts—a power common to sorcerers at all times and in all places. As to the origin of the Beast-form and Beast-name, we believe Mr. Lawson to be right. *Pheres* was at first a title of honour, or at least a name of power. Later, when the *Pheres* were conquered by incoming Achaeans, it may have got the evil connotation which is emphasized by Prof. Ridgeway.

With Cheiron in our minds—who loves not Cheiron?—it is delightful to be told that the best source for stories and traditions about the 'Callicantzari is the district about Mt. Pelion.' On Mt. Pelion the Callicantzari can assume any monstrous shape they choose, but on Mt. Pelion and elsewhere their power is—happily for the souls of the people—confined to the Twelve Days between Christmas and Epiphany. This brings the Callicantzari into direct and most instructive relation with such festivals as the Saturnalia and Brumalia and the rites of mummers, who, whether in January or March, drive out the Old year and bring in the New. Such mummings, with all the apparatus of masks, goat skins, beasts' tails, bells and the like, have been carefully observed by Mr. Lawson⁴ himself at Scyros and elsewhere, and by Mr. Dawkins⁵ at Bizya in Thrace. The Thracian mime is enacted at what was once a great centre of Dionysos worship. 'The mummers,' says Mr. Lawson, 'are the worshippers of a god,

¹ *Il.* ii. 743.

² *Pyth.* iv. 119.

³ *Early Age of Greece*, i. pp. 173 ff.

⁴ *B.S.A.*, vi. y. 125.

⁵ *I.H.S.* xxvi., 1906, p. 193.

whose name however and existence they and their forefathers have long forgotten.' We should like to see this stated otherwise; it is here we feel the lack of the Comparative Method causes some inadequacy of presentation, even some inversion of the truth. We should put it thus.

The mummers are not 'the worshippers of a god,' they are the material out of which the god was made—a material that survives never wholly deified in primitive strata of population. A god is a late and complex product. We think of Dionysos attended by his Satyrs; we think of the Satyrs as existing to attend Dionysos, as dependent on him, reflections, as it were, of his nature and characteristics. The truth is the other way round. The god is a great intellectual effort, a final emanation and culmination. The masked mummers are the material out of which he slowly develops. The mimetic dance, the study of comparative religion teaches us, is in itself magically potent long before that potency is incarnate in a god. The line as regards *potency* is not yet drawn between man and animal. Frogs bring the rain, and birds the spring; so you get more power by wearing a frog-mask, or a bird-mask, or a beast-mask. But it is you, and the frog, and the bird, and the beast, that do what you desire, and your potency is not yet precipitated into a Dionysos. It is this primitive impulse, preceding, and long-surviving theology that lives on in the May Day Mummers of England and the goat-men of Scyros.

Another suggestion we offer with more hesitation. Mr. Lawson proves that Callicantzaros is a descendant from Kentaur, but he nowhere tells us what Kentaur itself is derived from. The old connection with the *Gandharva* has been much discredited. In the light of Mr. Lawson's discussion we would ask—may it not be revived? I have no philological competence, and must leave the philological

question to others. But as regards the content of the two mythological conceptions, *Gandharva* and *Κένταυρος*, they are practically identical. Mr. Macdonnell¹ says 'the two conceptions appear to have nothing in common,' but he is surely thinking of the Vedic *Gandharvas*, the 'bright celestial beings.' For he himself notes that in the *Atharveda*, where primitive conceptions emerge so freely, the *Gandharvas* 'are said to be shaggy and to have half-animal forms.' The *Veda* has bowdlerised them, but in vain; they, as Prof. v. Schroeder² has shown, reappear in the *Atharveda*, as frankly fertility *δαίμονες*, nearer akin indeed to *Priapos* than *Dionysos*. If they are remote from the Centaurs of Pheidias, they are own brothers to the *Callicantzari* of Mt. Pelion.

We have taken only one instance of Mr. Lawson's fruitful method. Scarcely less interesting and suggestive are his chapters 'the Relation of Soul and Body' and the 'Union of Gods and Men.' All students of *Æschylus* should read what he has to say on modern Greek *Revenants*. No student of the Greek mysteries can afford to neglect the modern Greek view of Death as Marriage. But valuable as his chapter on the Union of Gods and Men is, it would have been ten times more valuable had it been based on a broader knowledge and comparison of primitive tribal initiation-ceremonies. To the primitive and to the mystical mind alike marriage is a means of *ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ*, but it is only one among many. Earlier and equally effective, as Pythagoras knew, is contact with a divine thunder-stone. The Comparative Method has risks great and many, but the risks must be run.

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¹ *Vedic Mythology*, p. 137.

² *Mysterium und Mimus im Rig Veda*, p. 61.

GRUNDFRAGEN DER HOMERKRITIK.

Grundfragen der Homerkritik. Von PAUL CAUER. Zweite stark erweiterte und zum Teil umgearbeitete Auflage. 8vo. Pp. viii + 552. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1909. M. 12.

THE value of this book is too well-established to require any praise in this place. Dr. Cauer has all the qualities of a Homeric guide, complete mastery of the materials (with one exception which will have to be mentioned presently), sane and penetrating judgment of evidence, sympathetic reverence for great poetry and understanding of the early poets' mind, and a gift for which foreign readers must be especially grateful—a transparent and attractive German style.

In this new edition, most of the original text of 1895 remains unchanged, but it is increased by new matter from 320 pages to 552. Dr. Cauer's main theory of the poems remains unchanged—diversity of authorship and unity of plan—the diversity chiefly at the beginning, in the dim Æolian days, the unity growing gradually towards the end, in the hands of Ionians who had lost the early gift of spontaneous creative language, but had gained a new art of large epic construction and a new fineness of psychological observation. He is less disposed than he was to take his criterion of diversity from apparent inconsistencies or divergences in the narrative; he thinks that these are often improvised by the poet for a momentary purpose, and that may have been done by a poet who knew the conflicting context, just as easily as by a poet who did not. See especially his sympathetic elucidations of the whole course of Γ and Ζ, of Thetis's too favourable description of Achilles' action in Σ 444-456, of the appearance of Eurykleia in τ (pp. 460-462, 469-473). But he will not therefore give any satisfaction to Mr. Lang. He vindicates these divergent passages, to prove not that the epic is the work of one poet, but that all the poets who worked on it had an equal right to deal freely with their materials, and not one of them is to be dismissed as a 'mere redactor' and 'wretched patcher.' In fact, he is fighting an opponent who is nearly extinct in England, but

flourishing in Germany, the critic to whom 'early' and 'great,' 'late' and 'poor,' are synonymous.

If there is anything to regret in the book, it is the absence of a few things which its plan seems to demand. It is a pity, for instance, that there is not a conspectus of the additions and alterations compared with the pages of the former edition, nor a German index of subjects and modern authors. (There was such an index in the former book.)

In the treatment of the recent literature, our own language has something to complain of. Full justice is done to the great achievement of Dr. Leaf and Mr. Allen in the classification of the manuscripts (pp. 15-25), and to Mr. Platt's inferences from the character of the similes (p. 266), there is a generous appreciation of Mr. Burrows (p. 277), Mr. Lang is just mentioned (p. 267), but important names are missing. Miss Clerke on manners and ways of life, Miss Harrison on religion, Professor Ridgeway and Professor Myres on ethnology and proto-Hellenic history, Professor Murray on all the secrets of a poet's and a people's mind, have said things that no Homeric student has a right to pass over, whether he accepts them or not. Even Samuel Butler's theory of the *Odyssey* deserved as much consideration as the opinions of Hermann Grimm, to which Dr. Cauer devotes nearly a page (p. 346). Dr. Cauer repeats his comparison of Virgil's with Homer's treatment of divine interventions (pp. 335-342), without noticing Professor Conway's treatment of the same question, leading to an exactly opposite conclusion, in his Inaugural Lecture at Manchester.

Another omission was inevitable, but has an unfortunate effect. Dr. Cauer is not a professed archaeologist. He gives full summaries of certain modern work, e.g. Dörpfeld's investigations in *Leukas*, and Noack's *Paläste*, but he scarcely attempts to take the bearing of the archaeological evidence as a whole. This is no disparagement in itself. Primarily he is a philologist, and his mastery of the philological field, on all its sides, is beyond dispute. As he says (p. 8), 'The investigation must be

conducted on each line separately. In this field also the right principle is to march separate and strike together.' But, as he goes on, 'each of the single columns must do its best to keep touch with those that march with it.' I say it with some diffidence, as an entire stranger to all archaeological experience, but on one main question I am afraid that he has not 'kept touch' quite sufficiently with the archaeologists. On the 'Thessalian and Peloponnesian' question he appreciates all the literary and linguistic evidence fully and acutely; and on that evidence his conclusion seems to me the right one, that all the main lines of our Trojan story grew up first on Thessalian, then on Æolic-Asiatic soil, and the association of our Homeric names with the Peloponnesian Mycenae and Sparta is a later process, which can be seen growing in the poems as we have them. But that is eminently a theory which requires confirmation from our historical knowledge of the Peloponnesus, and one of the main elements of that knowledge must be archaeological. Who were the builders of Mycenae? Greek rulers of non-Greek subjects, or non-Greek rulers of Greek subjects, or one kind of Greeks ruling another kind of Greeks, or neither of them Greeks at all? Greeks or not Greeks, did they ever invade the Troad, by themselves or in company with Greeks from Thessaly? Perhaps archaeology will never answer these questions, but in Dr. Cauer's discussion (pp. 191-237) I miss the attempt to demand its answer. But without that answer, or a definite assurance that it cannot be got, the answer from the literary evidence will always be incomplete.

With all my confidence in Dr. Cauer's philological judgment, there is one point on which I cannot follow him. He repeats, almost unchanged, his arguments of 1895, to prove that the poems were not reduced to writing until the Athenian official recension of the sixth century. That this recension was a fact, I think he is right in maintaining; our evidence is as good as our evidence for many other facts about the sixth century, and the one serious difficulty, the Alexandrian silence, is removed by Flach's suggestion that it was a Pergamene

discovery, which the Alexandrians thought it improper to mention.

But that the Athenian recensors found no written copies to work upon is to me simply incredible. To put aside all other arguments from the composition of the poems and from the general conditions of literature in the eighth and seventh centuries, can we believe that the Athenians of the sixth century, if they had had the unique opportunity of writing down the poems for the first time, would not have made them a great deal more Athenian than they are?

Here and there they have put in a stray line embodying an Athenian name, Theseus or Menestheus or Aethra or Phaedra, once they have put in five lines about Ariadne (A 321-325), once they have made Menestheus recur at intervals in a passage of nearly fifty lines (M 331-377), (reasserting the Athenian claim to Aias which they are said to have manufactured in B 558). To do so little as that, they must have been working on a fixed and finished text, which they could not venture to expand perceptibly. How could that fixity and completion have been secured except by writing? The evidence of the language points the same way. There is a little Attic colouring, of which Aristarchus and Cobet have made the most, but how much more there might have been is shown by the dialect of the metrical inscriptions.

Even the spelling of our texts, with its prevailing Ionicism where Atticism would metrically have done just as well or even better, can be explained only from Ionic manuscripts (τεύχεᾶ not τεύχη, Πηληϊάδεω not Πηληϊάδου, usually ἐμεῦ not ἐμοῦ). Dr. Cauer is right in defending the μεταχαρακτηρίσαντες against Wilamowitz and Ludwig, but they must belong to the eighth or ninth century and Asia, not to the sixth and Attica. The firmest adherent of Wackernagel has no need to postulate that Athens was the only place where ΦΟΣ could be falsely expanded into ΦΩΣ.

But all these are very small portions of the book. It would not be right to take leave of it with anything but an expression of admiration and gratitude.

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N

PSEUDOASCONIANA.

Pseudoasconiana. By T. STANGL. Paderborn: F. Schöningh. 1909. Pp. 202.

SINCE Madvig showed that the scholia upon the Verrines, found by Poggio at St. Gallen together with the commentary of Asconius upon five speeches of Cicero, are the work not of Asconius but of a later grammarian, probably belonging to the fifth century, they have been neglected by critics. Professor Stangl, of Würzburg, who is without doubt the chief living authority upon the scholiasts to Cicero, has now produced a most interesting work on the Pseudo-Asconius. His learning is attested by various treatises published in the course of the last twenty-five years. I would mention his series of articles upon the Scholiasta Bobiensis and the Pseudo-Asconius in the *Rheinisches Museum*, XXXIX. (1884), his Bobiensia published in 1894, and a second paper with the same title in *Philologus*, 1909, pp. 71-87; also three articles upon the Scholiasta Gronovianus in the *Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie*, 1906, Nos. 13, 14, 17. To these may be added two papers upon Asconius, and five articles upon my recent edition of that author, also printed in the same periodical (1906, Nos. 40, 41; 1909, Nos. 4, 9, 13, 19). I fear that it is too much for me to hope that a second edition of my own work may ever be called for, but, if it should, I shall have to thank him for many corrections, and shall adopt several emendations proposed by him. Thus I am quite convinced that on p. 6. 4 he is right in reading *licet* for the corrupt word *ait*, also on p. 35. 6 in regarding *eius* a dittography of *ei*.

The text of these scholia rests upon the same basis as that of Asconius, viz. the three MSS. *S P M*. The first of these is a copy of the lost Sangallensis made by Sozomenus of Pistoia, the second is that made by Poggio, and the third is derived from that made by Montepulciano. Kiessling and Schoell printed in an Appendix to their edition of Asconius select readings from *S* in the Pseudo-Asconius, but did

not give similar variants from *M*. Poggio's transcript, *P*, only came to light a few years ago. It was, however, upon descendants of this MS. that the text of these scholia from the *editio princeps* to Baiter has been based. Professor Stangl has collated *S* and *M*, and was supplied with a collation of *P* by P. Schmiedeberg. In certain places where doubt remained, *S* was re-examined by G. Zaccagnini, and *M* by R. C. Kukula. Stangl, therefore, is the first scholar who has had the materials necessary for scientific criticism of the Pseudo-Asconius.

The limits of this review do not allow me to discuss the whole of Stangl's work. I, therefore, content myself with a few passages from the Scholia to the Divinatio, in which he seems to me especially felicitous. The references are to the pages and lines of Baiter's edition. Where *S P M* agree, I use the symbol Σ .

98. 6 qui idoneus est facundia innocentiaque. Baiter with Lodoicus, que om. Σ . Stangl reads *facundia et* from *S* which has *facundiae*.

99. 16 dicit . . . aut a se accusandum esse Verrem]. So edd. from *P*, auctore (-rē *M*) *S M*: actore se Stangl.

102. 20 tametsi multis incommotis]. The lemma ends here in previous editors. The words of Cicero in the speech are *tametsi multis incommotis difficultatibusque adfectus*. Here *S* gives *incomm. uad.*, *P*

odis incomm. uad., and *M incomm.* Stangl reads *incommotis adfectus*. The last two words of the lemma appear to have been abbreviated in the Sangallensis.

103. 18. *Iidem completo quinquennio urbem lustrabant*]. *Urbem* was added by Lodoicus. Stangl supplies *pl.* (i.e. *populum*), pointing out that a *lustratio urbis* only took place in case of prodigies.

104. 10 *procurator si absentis negotium suscipit*]. *Absentis* was supplied by Hoto-man, and is necessary to the sense. The MSS., however, have a lacuna after *negotium*, not before it. Stangl, therefore, reads *si negotium <absentis>*.

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105. 29 iuris magis studiosi quam causi . . .]. So edd. with Σ: Stangl ingeniously supplements with -s *agendis*.

106. 13 eripuisti quicquid auri et gemmarum]. So edd., et om. Σ. Stangl defends the asyndeton by reference to Victorinus (*Rhet. Min.* p. 219 Hlam), *neque enim aurum gemmas probare artis est*.

107. 2 aspirare, in eam partem qua quidaesitum est vultum . . . advertere]. For *quid quaesitum*, Stangl adopts A. Gesner's certain correction *quidque situm*.

112. 19 deinde accusatorem firmum verumque esse. Firmum, ut possit, verum, ut velit.] After *esse* Cicero in the speech has *oportet*. Here *S M* give *esse affirmum*, from which Stangl elicits *esse oportet*, *Firmum*. It would appear that *oportet*, the last word in the lemma, was written *op.* in the Sangallensis.

116. 19 Factum est, non est factum, calumniatores]. Calumniatoris Stangl.

119. 10-11 est ergo persona primarium partium, quae saepius actu regreditur] saepius actura egreditur Stangl.

I regret that I cannot go on to add to the number of these fine corrections. These specimens, however, will show the scientific and methodical character of Stangl's criticism. I cannot refrain from noticing some passages in which his unrivalled knowledge of the vocabulary used by the later scholiasts leads him to defend popular spellings, e.g. 104. 21 praevaricare, 110. 9 quadriplatoribus, 117. 11 praestringiatoribus, 119. 5 palleata, and certain irregularities of syntax which have been removed by previous editors. Some of his notes must have cost him immense pains to construct, e.g. pp. 8-10 on the confusion of *hi*, *his*, *ii*, *iis*, etc., in the MSS. of Asconius and the Pseudo-Asconius.

I must say a few words upon the only point where I find myself in disagreement with Stangl, viz. his attitude towards the two chief MSS., *S* and *P*. No one now doubts that *S* is the most faithful witness. It is true that twenty-four years ago Stangl took a different view, but with praiseworthy candour he has retired from this untenable position. I need hardly say that I agree with his present view, as opposed to that which he held formerly.

Indeed, it was only my respect for his judgment which prevented me from expressing more strongly than I did in my Preface to Asconius my conviction that *S* is generally superior to *P*. I feel, however, that Stangl now goes further in the other direction than I can follow him. I hold that both Sozomenus and Poggio resorted to conjecture, the only difference between them being that Poggio was a more skilful critic, and therefore more fertile. I instance the following cases:

103. 7 post victor Sylla legem tulerat.

Post victor *P*, edd. (and Stangl): post victa *M*: post victoriam *S*. Stangl says, 'so lag sicher schon in Σ ein Fehler vor.' If so, both *S* and *P* emend with varying skill.

117. 9 Translative dixit ut 'magno ponderi subire.'

Translative Manutius: quasi latine *P*: quasi sarcinae *S*. Here *S* makes a very audacious conjecture, of which Stangl previously said 'S merkte natürlich auch dass die Vorlage verschrieben war und verbrach folgende Konjekture . . . quasi sarcinae.'

I add two passages from Asconius:

50. 2 dixerunt a manu Milonis occisum esse Clodium. *PM*: *S* adds, with Cicero, *consilio vero maioris alicuius*. It is inconceivable that *P* and *M* would both have omitted these words. They must, therefore, be a supplement inserted by Sozomenus from Cicero.

88. 2 gladiatores populo non debitos polliceretur.

P
S gives *populo*, *P* *poculo*, *M* *poculo*. It is clear that the Sangallensis had *poculo*. (In the Preface to my Asconius, p. xxxii, the readings have been misprinted; they are given correctly in the Apparatus.) I need not here repeat other cases (46. 15 and 16, 51. 11) to which I have called attention in my Preface.

The evidence of *M* has to be used with caution, since it embodies some conjectures made by Poggio and his friends in *P*. These, however, are generally striking readings, and in small points the tradition of *M* is independent. In some cases the agreement of *P* and *M* appears to me decisive against *S*, e.g.

106. 17 eum *P*: cum *M*: illum *S*.

Stangl says 'über Poggio's *eum* statt *illum* is unter 98. 1, gehandelt.' I should prefer to think that *cum* was in *Σ*, and was emended rightly by Poggio and wrongly by Sozomenus.¹

I cannot, therefore, agree with Stangl in four passages of Asconius where he would follow the collocation of words given in *S*, as against that in *P M*, viz. 83. 26, 85. 3 and 5, 87. 13.

It is easy to 'give a dog a bad name and hang him.' I instance the following case in Asconius:

32. 6 and 33. 1. In the first case the MSS. give *accurrerunt*; in the second they vary between *accurrerunt* and *accucurrerunt*. Stangl says on the second passage, 'Accucurrerunt *S*: accurrerunt *P M*. Poggio konnte es sich nicht versagen die tadellose Klausel — — — der von 32. 6 auszugleichen (plures Miloniani accurrerunt) und damit die schulgerechte Perfektform herzustellen.'

¹ Cf. Asconius 36. 1. eum *P*: cum *S M*. Sozomenus in the margin says *C* (i.e. *corrigan*) eum.

Unfortunately, however, by a very pardonable error, the readings of the MSS. are here reversed. It is *S* which gives *accurrerunt*, while *P M* have *accucurrerunt*. In common fairness, therefore, if anyone is here to be gibbeted, as desiring to introduce the usual form in both cases, it should be Sozomenus, not Poggio.

These are very minute points, and their importance is but small. What is clear is that Stangl is in a position to produce what would be virtually an *editio princeps* of these scholia. It is, therefore, to be hoped that he will soon provide us with a text to supersede that of Baiter, which is now obsolete. Those who remember the painful controversy which was excited by a recent edition of the Scholiasta Bobiensis would feel it fitting that Stangl's long labours upon the text should result in an edition of this author also. It would be easy for him to include the Scholiasta Gronovianus, and thus produce a complete collection of the scholiasts to Cicero.

ALBERT C. CLARK.

THE ODES OF HORACE I-III

The Odes of Horace I-III. Student's Edition. By E. R. Garnsey. 8vo. Pp. 321. London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1910. 6s. net.

HORACE feared to fall into the hands of schoolboys, but he should have dreaded scholars more. Bentley's emendations, Peerlkamp's excisions, and Markland's doubts 'whether he understood a single Ode' are cruel enough to bear, but what must he now suffer in the shades, when he learns that he did not write lyrics but tragedy, that his poems are 'hyponic,' and that Barine—with whom as lads we have all been in love—was 'not only a perfidious harlot' but also intended to suggest 'that creature called "incubo,"' her name, with fine disregard of quantity, being derived from *βάρος*, weight, incubus.' And yet it is to this that the criticism of a great poet has come, since Dr. Verrall, ever searching like the Athenians

of old for 'some newer thing,' found that Horace in the last line of the Third Book of the Odes addressed himself to Melpomene. For Melpomene is the Muse of Tragedy, and therefore when Horace asks her favour for his completed work the character of that work must be essentially tragic. Elsewhere, indeed, Horace himself makes Melpomene watch over his cradle 'with placid eye,' credits her with 'tempering to sweetness the music of the golden shell,' and thanks her for placing him among the 'loveable bards' of Rome: but that and the prejudice of twenty centuries go for nothing. Gloom, pathos, and melancholy are, it seems, the dominant characteristics of the Odes, nor for the new Sherlock-Holmes school of critics is the clue to this strange phenomenon difficult to discover. For in 22 B.C. Murena, brother of Terentia, the wife of Maecenas, was put to death for conspiring against Augustus, while by warning his wife of her

brother's danger, Maecenas, who thus forfeited the confidence of the Emperor, had ruined his own fortunes; and it is round this unhappy story, which so closely touched his great benefactor, that the thoughts of Horace centre continually. It is ever in his mind, and underlies his every utterance. The Ode to Murena (3. 19), for instance, with its 'drunkenness, prodigality, wantonness, mischief, and insane luxury,' must be read and interpreted with close reference to it. So too must the great Ode to Fortune, and the *Non ebur neque aurum* of the Second Book, and this theory which Dr. Verrall put forward in 1884 may, not improbably, have some basis of truth; but Mr. Garnsey takes it up in order, with the zeal of a disciple, to push it to impossible lengths. With him everything is 'Murenaic.' Because the three first Books of the Odes were published together, he maintains that, in spite of their diversity of style and substance, they constitute a single work, a *monumentum* raised with a definite design and purpose with which each separate part fits in, and to which it must be accommodated. In spite of all evidence to the contrary (e.g. in 1. 31 *Quid dedicatum* and in the Cleopatra Ode where an earlier date seems almost necessary) he does not think that 'one of the Odes had been composed before the fall of Maecenas in 22 B.C.,' and their perfection of form, their *curiosa felicitas* of phrase is, it seems, not due to patient art, to 'the labour of the file,' or to revision 'after the ninth year,' but is rather the sudden outcome of deep emotion breaking out into poetry, which Mr. Garnsey, following a French critic, would define as 'the language of a state of crisis.' And then to these strange paradoxes, he adds another which is yet stranger. For Horace, it appears, writes in riddles. He is everywhere not only 'allusive' but 'elusive.' Everything he pens has two meanings, one for the 'profane mob,' which includes every reader for some eighteen centuries, and the other for the initiated. Even the Ode to Asterie is no mere idle trifle, no delightful fancy of a poet's brain, but 'contains touches charged with meaning to contemporary cognoscenti.' The *Donec gratus eram*,

which Munro sneered at as 'a neat enough mosaic,' is now declared to be 'little better than euphonious rubbish,' unless we connect it with Murena. Calais, we are told, is 'described in it as the son of Ornitus' (the text gives *Ornyti*), and 'there are winds called the Ornithiæ,' and winds throughout the Odes are 'precursors of trouble,' so that somehow—for the argument is very disjointed—Calais 'represents a supposititious supplanter of Murena in the affections of Lydia his wife or mistress, and the Ode is really a gibe on his relation with 'Lydia' pointed with satires on his vain imaginations.' Sybaris too, Pyrrhus, Telephus, Grosphus, Hebrus Liparaeus and half a score more are all Murena in disguise. So also is the Delliis or Gellius of 2. 3, where, however, Mr. Garnsey prints *mori-ture Gillo* in the text, for Juvenal, it seems, understands Horace's secret, and the line (1. 40)—

Unciolam Procleius habet sed Gillo deuncem

is a hit at Murena's defrauding his too-confiding brother of a portion of the inheritance which came to them from Varro, 'Gillo, the vessel for cooling or for mixing wines being a nickname for the Murena of 3. 19, the man who "aquam temperet ignibus." And as nicknames come in, of course the famous *Bibuli consulis amphoram* is not a mild joke, but 'a gibe at the vinous Murena,' for as Bibulus set himself to oppose Julius, so Murena conspired against the son of Julius, and the analogy is obvious. Then after nicknames come puns, for is not *laqueata tecta* in 2. 16. 11 clearly a play on words? May it not mean 'roofs to which the noose of a rope has been applied (cf. Dict. s.v. *laqueo*), roofs or towers (cf. *turres* 2. 10. 11) which fall with the greatest crash,' and does it not also suggest 'the execution of Murena by the *laqueus* or strangling-rope'? Or, finally, if a storm is described, then even 'the setting of Orion' (*pronus Orion*) becomes 'the fall of Murena,' which was accompanied by an outburst of feeling which might well be called *tumultus*, and Murena is clearly Orion, the *tentator Dianae*, for although Dr. Verrall allows that our knowledge of his story is 'but the barest outline,'

Mr. Garnsey knows all about him. He knows that he was hunchbacked, a believer in metempsychosis, the associate of women like Leuconoë—the name, it seems, means ‘evil-minded’—who had influence over him on account ‘of her pretensions to occult power,’ and, above all, that he was determined by fair means or foul to get Julia the daughter of Augustus into his hands. And so we set out on a new game of hide-and-seek in search of Julia. Neobule, ‘a young woman with an inclination to excitement and dissipation on whom her domestic duties palled’ suits at once. Or ‘positing a design by Murena on Julia’s hand against the will of her father’ we see who ‘secluded Danaë’ must refer to, while Chloe, ‘whose *arrogantia* deserved a stroke from Venus,’ comes also into the list, and as for Europe ‘matured consideration and study of Horace’s language force me,’ says the Editor, ‘to the conclusion that this long dwelling on the legend, example and fortune of the girl who fell in love with a ‘monster,’ may really be due to the part played by the Emperor’s daughter in the Murenaic tragedy.’

But to pursue the subject further would be an idle task. The reader who will accept what has been already quoted from this volume will accept anything. For when Horace called his work *monumentum aere perennius*, if he did so because it is a marvellous cryptogram, then assuredly its survival is the most stupendous paradox known to literary history. On that hypothesis it has been the admiration and delight of sixty generations for reasons which are wholly accidental, and men with perverse stupidity have ranked Horace among the immortals because they accounted him a poet, though his own ambition was to be a prophet or a writer of

conundrums. And if his work is in reality a riddle, of which ingenuity can to-day supply the clue, how could Horace ever have published it? If to-day a modern Daniel can show the interpretation of it, certainly Roman society in 22 B.C. could have done so with vastly greater ease. And that Horace should have issued a work, which from beginning to end teems with recognizable allusions to events which both Augustus and Maecenas must have desired to see overwhelmed in oblivion, passes the measure of reasonable belief. That he should have done so and retained, as he did, the confidence and affection of both of them, is a patent impossibility.

To write thus strongly is unpleasant but unavoidable. Mr. Garnsey’s interest in Horace, his industry, and devotion to classical study are beyond question and merit high praise. But he has followed a fatal guide and has got into a quagmire. Dr. Verrall has lured him to his ruin, as his brilliant and erratic genius will, it is to be feared, lure many impressionable but misguided students. For the great classical writers have stuff in them, stand on solid ground and live, as it were, in the sunlight. Their plainest meaning is their truest meaning—for how else should they be great writers?—and it is just because they can be understood of the vulgar, because they appeal to ordinary minds and simple intelligences that they are immortal. Some secrets they may, indeed, conceal, for the language of imagination must be at times ‘elusive,’ but mists and fogs, ‘vapours and exhalations,’ do not provide the atmosphere which a true poet deliberately chooses. He has other aims than to supply a setting for the dazzling antics of Will-o’-the-wisp.

T. E. PAGE.

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PURSER'S CUPID AND PSYCHE.

The Story of Cupid and Psyche, as related by APULEIUS. Edited with introduction and notes, by LOUIS C. PURSER, Litt.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin. Frontispiece, Canova's group of Cupid and Psyche from the Villa Carlotta, Cadenabbia; p. ix, a Paris contorniate, representing Apuleius; photographs. 8vo. 1910. Pp. cviii + 155. London: G. Bell and Sons.

DR. PURSER'S excellent edition of the *Cupid and Psyche* of Apuleius is most welcome. Hitherto the student of Apuleius' *chef d'œuvre* has had to go to Holland or Germany for a commentary. Now, thanks to Dr. Purser, we have not only an English commentary, but one which is in many respects fuller and more judicious than any that has preceded it. The introduction is comprehensive and interesting. The first chapter gives an excellent account of the life and writings of Apuleius. The scanty data are handled with great skill and caution, and the result is a biography on which it would be hard to improve. It is difficult, however, to accept Dr. Purser's view that the *Metamorphoses* were written earlier than the *Apologia*, but published anonymously. It is hard to see why so self-confident a writer should have suppressed his name. The publication of the novel under his own name could not have injured his reputation. Further, there is no cogent reason for supposing that it was an early work, and there are two strong arguments against it. The first is stated by Dr. Purser. If the *Metamorphoses* had been published, those who accused Apuleius of the black art would almost assuredly have made play with the magical elements of the novel in the course of their indictment. The second argument is that in the opening chapter of the first book Lucius claims to be descended on his mother's side from the philosopher Sextus, the nephew of Plutarch. Now Sextus was still alive, though a very old man, in A.D. 160, and it is scarcely likely that Apuleius would have made his disreputable hero the descendant of Sextus during the latter's lifetime. The

Metamorphoses would seem therefore to have been written later than the *Apologia*. The only other points to which exception can be taken in this excellent chapter are the views expressed of the 'Ovos' of the Pseudo-Lucian and its relations to the *Metamorphoses*. Dr. Purser holds that Apuleius was 'closely following the treatise which is published among the works of Lucian, called Λούκιος ἡ 'Ovos.' He goes on to say that the most probable view about the 'Ovos' is that it is a short parody on the two books of *Metamorphoses*, attributed by Photios to Lucius of Patrae, who 'took or seemed to take the subject quite seriously.' It may readily be admitted that the problem is incapable of any precise solution, but Bürger¹ has at least made it probable that both the Pseudo-Lucian and Apuleius were copying the work of Lucius of Patrae. Further, while the 'Ovos' is an obvious and not always very skilful abridgment, it is difficult to discover the least ground for calling it a parody. Photius, it is true, detected the Lucianesque spirit in it, but one may suspect that he did so because he believed the work to be by Lucian. In any case the problem needs fuller statement than has been given to it by Dr. Purser.

The second chapter on the legend of Cupid and Psyche itself is clear and judicious, but might with advantage have been somewhat fuller. Many different strands seem to go to make up the story, as has been well shown by MacCulloch in his *Childhood of Fiction*. A note on the significance of the prominence given to the youngest sister would also have been valuable. Also there should have been some further reference to the perplexing statement of Fulgentius (*myth.* 3. 6) that the same story was treated by 'Aristophontes Athenaeus.' It is also rather a daring assertion to say that it was probably Apuleius himself who first mythologised the story of the princess and the fairy prince. It may have been so, but evidence is entirely lacking, and it is rash, in view of what we do know of Apuleius' habits of borrowing, to

¹ De Lucio Patrensi, Berlin, 1887.

assume that he was original in anything except style.

The third chapter on the style and diction of Apuleius is admirable, though we should have been grateful had Dr. Purser said rather more about the new Sophistic movement.

The final chapter deals with the MSS. and the editions of Apuleius. The treatment of the MSS. is perhaps a little perfunctory. Dr. Purser accepts the view first enunciated by Keil that all the MSS. of Apuleius derive from F and Φ. That view is probably substantially correct, but it is not perhaps so certain as recent editors assert that there are no traces of other MS. tradition.

The text of Dr. Purser is most judicious and his notes are admirable. We have but one criticism to offer—namely, that Dr. Purser's attempts to reproduce the oddities of Apuleius' style are not very successful. Dr. Purser is not to be blamed for this,

save in so far as he has attempted an impossible task. The notes deserve fuller discussion than space will here permit.

The book concludes with three appendices on Milesian tales, the allegorical interpretation of the story, and on Meleager's poems on Love and the Human Soul. With reference to the Milesian tales of Aristides might not Ovid's 'iunxit Aristides Milesia crimina secum' mean that Aristides wrote Milesian stories in which he himself posed as the hero? This would suit the novels of Lucius of Patrae, the Pseudo-Lucian and Apuleius.

This review has been mainly concerned with criticism. That is due to the exigencies of space. Dr. Purser's edition is a work of unusual excellence and interest. If he seems to his reviewer sometimes to take Apuleius a little too seriously, that is perhaps discreditable only to his reviewer.

H. E. BUTLER.

New College, Oxford.

ACCIDENTS OF AN ANTIQUARY'S LIFE

Accidents of an Antiquary's Life. By D. G. HOGARTH. London: Macmillan. 1910. Price 7s. 6d. net.

MR. HOGARTH tells us, in the introductory 'Apology' of his autobiographical volume, that he is no antiquary born, but one made by a series of accidents. This may be doubted: he says himself that 'the charm of guessing ancient motives from the records of ancient deeds' fascinated him when an undergraduate, and surely he who from the first wishes to know the why and wherefore of ancient deeds is no less an antiquary 'born' than he who only desires to chronicle them. Surely the 'antiquary' seeks to find out new facts with regard to what is old *rerum, cognoscere causas*. Anyhow, Mr. Hogarth has been happy in the 'accidents' that, accepting his own opinion, have turned a wondering scholar into an antiquary.

They were happy 'accidents' that took him to explore and to dig for the causes of things in the 'Nearer East' (of which phrase, by the way, he is the inventor), in

Syria, in Anatolia, in Greece, and in Egypt. And they are happily described, in a style not slightly flavoured with Gallic salt. Mr. Hogarth is French in his art of making us see the scenes that he describes, French, too, in the art that conceals this art. But the salt with which he serves up his humorous incidents is English enough. Of the accidents described by the earlier Wandering Scholar in the Levant two have fixed themselves in the memory as illustrative of Mr. Hogarth's lighter manner; one grave, the nightmare drive down the Caly-cadnus valley to Selefke with the sudden vision of the unknown castle by the way, the other gay, the miseries of the pasha's harim on board the Scotch tramp steamer. His first book, *Devia Cypria* ('whose title,' the author says, 'has deceived more than once, I am told, sanguine buyers of Erotica'), being a more 'solid' contribution to archaeology, had hardly given him much scope for his descriptive powers. But with the two scenes from the 'Wandering Scholar' in the mind, one turned with pleasure and expectation to the 'Antiquary.' Nor was one dis-

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appointed. A merry tale on p. 30 and the adventure of the Serpent-Slayer of Lake Mariût may suffice now for the humorous side of things, though the description of the British subaltern as the Solomon of a Cretan village has its humorous side. War, the grim, real war and hate of the Near East, in Crete, is serious fare enough for the reader, and gives Mr. Hogarth reason to say true things about the Greeks (p. 25). A war of the elements, also in Crete, is well pictured in the description of a storm-flood at Zakro during Mr. Hogarth's excavations there. Peaceful archaeology, disturbed neither by human nor by celestial commotion, has its Cretan innings in the account of the successful exploration of that cold, dank, and deep hole in the bleak hillside above Psychro (well so named), which is the Dictaeon Cave. Then for the benefit of the inquisitive partner of the dinner-table Mr. Hogarth describes the comforts of tomb-digging in Egypt and tells the story of his successful excavations at

Ephesus. But of all the descriptions in this book perhaps the best and most interesting are that of the fens of the Nile-Delta and that of Cyrene. The accident that took Mr. Hogarth to Cyrene by machinery of the steam-yacht *Ootowana* and her Owner, was perhaps the happiest of all. For to it we owe the first description for many years of the coast to which the Pythia sent the men of Thera, of the fountain in Irasa where Battus founded his city, and of the condition of the remains of the city in modern days. We may sincerely hope that it is reserved to Mr. Hogarth some day to excavate Cyrene.

More need not be said of a book by Mr. Hogarth; we shall all read it with pleasure, and its writer might well say to his reviewer here:

Τυδείδῃ, μήτ' ἄρ' με μάλ' αἶνεε μήτε τι νείκει·
εἰδοῖσι γὰρ τοι ταῦτα μετ' Ἀργείους ἀγορεύεις.

H. R. HALL.

THE UNITY OF THE LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE: A QUEST.

I.

The Unity of the Latin Subjunctive: a Quest.

By E. A. SONNENSCHN. 9" x 5".

Pp. 60. London: John Murray, 1910.

Cloth, 2s. net.

MOST readers of the *Classical Review* will have read the address on this subject which Professor Sonnenschein delivered at the Birmingham meeting of the Classical Association (printed in Vol. 6 of the Proceedings). He then put forward the view that the fundamental meaning of the subjunctive was 'obligation', using that term in a broad sense. . . . By "obligation" I mean simply the concrete idea that something *is to be* or *has to be*. . . . The English verb "shall" originally denoted obligation or debt; but it has come to express pure futurity in certain persons. . . . The same sort of thing, I hold, has happened in the case of the Latin subjunctive.' The paper was suggestive, but the subject needed fuller treatment, and that it has received in the book before us. The writer has made his case

much stronger by showing how suitable the 'shall' meaning is in proverbial sayings of which there are numerous examples in early (as well as in later) Latin: e.g. *Ubi mortuos sis, ita sis ut nomen cluet*, 'when you are (lit. shall be) dead, dead you shall be,' i.e. 'it is determined by some law of . . . nature, that when a man is once dead he is bound to be dead indeed.' He sets beside these the *videas, invenias* type, and points out an interesting parallel in the English 'you shall see,' 'you shall find,' etc.

He works out with great skill the effect of the context on the meaning of the subjunctive. 'The mood' he says 'is a chameleon whose colour depends on its environment.' Having thus established in our minds an idea of the fundamental meaning of the inflexion, he proceeds to trace the derivation of all the chief uses of the subjunctive from this meaning.

The theory is an attractive one in itself; it gives a satisfactory explanation of several difficulties which other theories have left unexplained, and it does not seem to involve

a strained interpretation of any of the facts. But, apart from this, the treatise is valuable for the many good things that are said on the way. The writer constantly touches on questions which present themselves to any intelligent student or teacher of Latin, and he never touches on them without throwing light.

W. E. P. PANTIN.

II.

PROFESSOR SONNENSCHN's ingenious and able treatise deserves a hearty welcome from both grammarians and teachers. Particularly illuminating is the section on 'A neglected Use of the Subjunctive,' and the attribution of a wide range of uses to a fundamental meaning of 'obligation,' 'determined futurity,' is supported by a wealth of examples from all periods of Latin literature. As regards the Subjunctive of Wish, however, the author is, happily for the philologist, less convincing than in dealing with other independent uses of this mood: he seems concerned to prove rather that 'Wish' is a weaker form of 'Will' than that it necessarily contains the idea of 'obligation,' 'natural necessity,' or 'determined futurity.' I quote the different possibilities advisedly, and would ask Professor Sonnenschein to show us how 'the idea that something is to happen, is bound to happen, shall happen' underlies a wish for fine weather.

In regard to subordinate clauses the theory is lucidly worked out for the Consecutive Subjunctive, where at first sight the application seems less obvious than in the case of dependent commands and general 'prospective' uses. On the other hand, in dealing with *cum* and the Subjunctive in its various meanings, Professor Sonnenschein himself seems to give up the effort to prove the existence of his root-meaning for the mood and falls back upon the explanation of it as 'a stylistic peculiarity of the classical period,' adding after some discussion of the Subjunctive of attendant circumstances, the significant words '... we have the meaning bearing in mind that, always remembering that.' It is interesting to find Professor Sonnenschein thus lending unconscious support to the *subjunctive* theory

of the Subjunctive, and an equally instructive instance is found on page 53, where Captivi 208, *nos fugiamus?* (which is made a bridge between the obligation use, in support of which it is adduced on page 27, and the use in subordinate clauses of Oratio Obliqua) is translated 'Would you have us run away? do you talk of our running away?'

Attractive therefore as is Professor Sonnenschein's 'shall' theory, and admirable the skill with which he has worked it out in detail, I still find myself unable to merge the Optative uses with those of 'determined futurity,' nor can I think that the Oratio Obliqua difficulty in particular has been adequately met; consequently I remain for the present an adherent of the syncretic origin of the Latin subjunctive.

E. PURDIE.

Cheltenham Ladies' College.

III.

IN reply to your letter asking my opinion on Sonnenschein's *Unity of the Subjunctive*, I may say that I read the copy he was kind enough to send me and made some remarks in acknowledging it. They came, I think, shortly to this, that I thought the paper very well written, with much care and moderation, and that most of the explanations of the use of the subjunctive seemed to me right or at least tenable. As an argument for the conclusion to which he came it is probably as good as can be. I differ mainly in thinking that the unity of the subjunctive is not to be sought in one of the branches of its development, but in a more general notion. Will, command, desire have, it seems to me, too full-blooded a meaning to be probable or suitable for the common parent. I suppose, as I said long ago in my grammar,¹ the subjunctive to denote originally thought as opposed to fact, and to apply to an action presented to the mind as possible, not actual. It may be desired or supposed or reported, etc., and each line of development may well accord or contrast in practice with the others. In fact, while recognising fully the ability of Prof. Sonnenschein's essay and the skill of

¹ E.g., *Larger Gram.*, Part II., Pref., pp. xcviij, xcix.

the deductions, I think it would have been better entitled 'of the reduction of all usages of the subjunctive to an original volitive or jussive.' The ultimate or initial unity of the subjunctive is, I should have supposed, generally held already.

HENRY J. ROBY.

Lancrigg, Grasmere, June 27.

IV.

THE Editor of the *Classical Review* places before me Professor Sonnenschein's paper on *The Unity of the Latin Subjunctive* and the comments thereon of three other grammarians, inviting me to add my remarks. It is a matter for the laughter of gods and men. So much talk about a problem which interests pedants and pedagogues only, so much wrangling about points which should have been settled two thousand years ago if they could be settled at all! Even classical scholars give a shrug of impatience as they read the title, and teachers hug the more closely their own pet phrases as they scent from afar some new assault upon them.

For all this, so long as Latin is taught pupils will ask 'What does the Subjunctive in Latin mean?' and if no answer is given them, will begin again for themselves the weary round of hypotheses which in the long run prove too broad here and too narrow there. And whilst they are looking for a satisfactory theory they will be likely to miss the point which is so obvious to the grammarian that he often forgets to state it, namely that the Latin Subjunctive has a history, and that its use depends largely upon the historical development of the language, and largely also upon accidents of fashion of which no reasoned account can be given.

For this reason all attempts to compress the theory of the Subjunctive into a phrase are bound to fail.

Following Mr. Roby, all the schoolboys of to-day glibly repeat that 'the Indicative expresses a fact, the Subjunctive an idea.' Following Professor Sonnenschein those of to-morrow will say that 'the Subjunctive expresses natural necessity or determined futurity.' And then to their dismay they

come upon an Indirect Question, a Consecutive clause, or '*cum* with the Subjunctive'; either theory breaks down, and Latin Grammar is pronounced 'rot.' Only a few discover many years after that these theories were never meant for daily use in construing Cicero, but refer only to a time in the far-distant past with regard to which conclusive evidence can never be forthcoming; they state what the Subjunctive *was*, only to encourage the grammarian in the weary search after what the Subjunctive *is*; they assert that the Subjunctive is *one*, because it is such a truism that the Subjunctive is *many*.

All such theories are, in my judgment, far too dangerous to be admitted into school grammars, because the schoolboy cannot appreciate so intricate a subject as the development of linguistic forms. All of them, when properly qualified and expounded, are almost equally satisfactory as supplying a thread to which an orderly treatment of the mood can be attached. Amongst them I give the preference to the theory referred to by Miss Purdie, that the Subjunctive Mood is really the Subjunctive Mood, and colours the event named with the suggestion of something that is thought or proposed. Thus we do away with Mr. Roby's 'thought as *opposed to fact*,' as indeed we have to search far for such an opposition in Latin, where the meaning of *cum dixisset* is identical with that of *postquam dixit*. We also make the notion of futurity unessential; doubtless men's thoughts dwell mostly on the future (or at any rate did in those barbaric times which preceded the invention of old age), but memories also are thoughts, and it seems impossible in the face of Latin usage to maintain that futurity was an idea deeply rooted in this mood.

Nevertheless, Professor Sonnenschein makes out a good case for his point of view, and it has illuminating force in many details. Negatively, I think the writer has demolished the so-called 'philological theory,' that the Latin Subjunctive includes two fundamental meanings, one derived from the Subjunctive, the other from the Optative of the parent language. In spite of Miss Purdie's difficulty, I think a child

or a savage wishing for fine weather would readily say, 'It *must* be fine to-morrow,' or 'It has *got* to be fine,' with considerable emphasis on the words here italicised.

But I agree most fully with Mr. Pantin when he lays stress on the value of the many good things which are said 'by the way.' The supreme value of classical training lies in exact translation, that is, in the complete understanding of another's thought. And throughout the book we find the author dealing with difficult expressions with a masterly touch, which has achieved triumph in two long-standing difficulties at least; I mean the interpretation of Plautus, *Trin.* 496,

ubi mortuos sis, ita sis ut nomen cluet,

'when one is dead, dead one is bound to be'; and in the analysis of the miscalled 'deliberative Subjunctive' as an interrogation as to a supposed command, e.g. *maneam?* 'do you suggest that I should stay?' 'are you saying to me, Stay?'

In the latter case the explanation is also in substantial agreement with that given in Postgate's *New Latin Primer*, § 384.

May one say that the writer is now under a 'natural obligation' to attempt a balanced view of the Latin Subjunctive as a whole, in which the usages which belong to the later development of the mood in Latin shall be allowed their full relative importance?

E. V. ARNOLD.

NOTES AND NEWS

MR. DEVINE, headmaster of Clayesmore School, has published a pamphlet, called 'A Crisis in the Education of the Governing Classes of England' (Letchworth: Garden City Press. 1d.). His view is that our schools are out of touch with life; and that education, especially of the middle and upper classes, is at the root of national efficiency. His danger-signal is that the boy of fifteen 'exhibits all the symptoms of a mind dazed by unsubstantial images and formulae of which he has never known the context'—these words are quoted—and 'even at that early age, apart from sheer waste of time, great and perhaps irreparable injury has been done to the boy's mind.' Public apathy is responsible for this, if it be a true description: but surely it is the duty of all who are engaged in education to examine the facts dispassionately, even if the result be unfavourable to their own beliefs.

The *Times* of July 27 publishes an interesting but somewhat discursive letter from Dr. M. Ohnefalsch-Richter, describing recent discoveries of important remains near Kouklia (Old Paphos), Cyprus. The locality, which is on the edge of the forest of Randi, or Randiti, to the east of Kouklia,

is thought by him to be the site of the earlier sanctuary of Aphrodite. The excavators of Paphos in 1888 found nothing on their site earlier than the fourth century B.C. Dr. Richter's view is based on the discovery of numerous inscriptions in the Cypriote syllabary, ten of which are to be included in Professor Meister's *Corpus*, now in course of compilation. Fragments of clay statues of sixth or seventh century date were also found, and early terra-cotta figurines, but nothing as late as the fourth century. The earlier site must have been destroyed by an earthquake about 400 B.C.

Subsequently Mr. Hogarth writes (August 5) to say that at Xylino to the north of Kouklia a Greek dedication to Aphrodite, a Phoenician inscription, and other early objects came to light in June last. He thinks this a more probable site than the distant and waterless Rantidi, and points out that they were only accidentally prevented from exploring the Xylino site in 1888. He considers Rantidi to be an early necropolis rather than a temple-site.

And now comes a letter to the *Times* (August 27) from Mr. J. C. Peristianis, Keeper of the Cyprus Museum, who says that Dr. Ohnefalsch-Richter's statements

have proved to be largely unfounded. There is, he says, an ancient site with a temple in the Rantidi forest; inscriptions from this site now in the museum disclose a cult of Bacchus, Zeus, and Kore. The

ancient temple of Paphian Aphrodite remains on the spot where it was discovered in 1888, and the writer has found another temple of the same goddess north of Palaeophos.

ARCHAEOLOGICAL NOTES

Les Apollons Archaiques. By W. DEONNA, with Preface by H. LECHAT. 12 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ ". Pp. 408, nine plates, 202 cuts in text. Geneva, 1909. 32s.

A VERY exhaustive study of the masculine type in Greek sculpture of the sixth century B.C. Part I. of the work is devoted to a general study of the types, their meaning, the influences apparent in the style, and such matters as technique, attitude and proportions, and anatomical details. Part II. gives a list of the known examples according to provenance, (a) in stone, (b) in bronze and other materials. In Part III. they are classified according to style, in three main groups: Ionic, Insular, and Continental. The earliest types (about 610 B.C.) have been found in Delos; the latest are the Strangford and Piombino 'Apollons,' representing the result of a whole century's development. While during this period the type preserves its conventionality, e.g. in stiffness of attitude and strict frontality, there is a marked advance in the rendering of anatomical detail, in spite of the struggles with material. This long period of training made possible the sudden perfection of fifth century athlete statues, of Myron and Polycleitos, in which the freedom from the law of frontality is complete. The volume is furnished with useful tables and indices, and the illustrations, though not of great artistic merit, are adequate for their purpose.

Griechische Reliefs und Inschriften im Kunstmuseum zu Kristiania. By S. EITREM. Pp. 22, nine cuts. Christiania, 1909. 1s.

A SERIES of reliefs obtained from Smyrna in 1870 described and reproduced, with

an excursus on the Sepulchral Banquet reliefs.

Die Komposition der pompejanischen Wandgemälde. By GERHART RODENWALT. 9 $\frac{1}{8}$ " x 6 $\frac{1}{8}$ ". Pp. 270, 38 cuts. Berlin: Weidmann, 1909. M. 9.

A STUDY of the principles of composition in ancient paintings with the object of discovering what light is thrown on the relation of the Pompeian to the Greek. Deals chiefly with architectural and landscape effects, especially the treatment of 'interiors,' as suggested by the descriptions in classical writers and as known from the successive styles of Pompeian wall-painting.

The Decorative Art of Crete in the Bronze Age: A Dissertation presented to the Faculty of Bryn Mawr College for the degree of Ph.D. By EDITH H. HALL. With chronological table, 3 plates, and 69 cuts. 10" x 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. 48. Philadelphia, 1907.

A CLASSIFICATION of the designs on Minoan pottery as imitative (or naturalistic) and non-imitative (or inorganic) motives, showing their chronological development.

Ceramica Sardo-Fenicia nel Museo Civico di Pavia. By VITTORIO MACCHIORO. [From the *Bullettino della Società Pavese di Storia Patria*.] Pp. 24, with plate. Pavia, 1908.

DESCRIBES over 90 pieces (vases and lamps), mainly jugs and open bowls of plain ware; all appear to belong to an early period, and have come from Tharros.

The Romano-British Establishment at Stroud near Petersfield, Hants. By A. MORAY WILLIAMS, B.A. [From the *Archaeological Journal*, lxvi (2nd Ser. xvi.), pp. 33-52.] Seven plates. London and Aylesbury: Hunt Barnard and Co., 1909.

A REPORT on the completion of an interesting excavation, carefully carried out. The building presents several curious features, and is thought to have been a bathing establishment.

CORRESPONDENCE

'DUPLICATION' IN CLASSICAL REVIEWS

To the Editor of THE CLASSICAL REVIEW.

SIR,—In the Proceedings of the Classical Association for 1910, p. 32, I am correctly reported to have used these words: 'The fact of having two journals means duplicating a certain amount of work. Some persons take in both journals, so that they will get the review of a certain book in one journal, and some months later a review of the same book in the other journal.' In reply to Dr. Postgate's letter in the number for August (p. 165), I have simply to say that I was referring to a matter within my own experience. In 1909, as Editor of the *Classical Review*, you did me the honour of inviting me to write for that journal a review of the first part of Traube's *Vorlesungen und Abhandlungen*. In the same year the Editor of the *Classical Quarterly* published, in the April number, Professor W. M. Lindsay's excellent review of Traube's works, one of the only two books mentioned at the head of the article being the first part of Traube's *Vorlesungen und Abhandlungen*, which was briefly but sufficiently noticed. Any arrangement that admits of the possibility of two reviews of the same book appearing in the two journals clearly implies 'duplicating a certain amount of work.' The Chairman, Mr. Butcher, who also presides over the new Board of Management, subsequently said: 'Clearly the same book should not be reviewed in both publications.' Another member of the Board added: 'There is now no possibility of duplication.' I had carefully read the book which I had been asked to review, but, after these definite declarations of policy, it was clearly undesirable that my notice should appear in the *Classical Review*.

Dr. Postgate invites me to 'complete' my statement by giving instances of duplication during the years 1907-9. I reply that I did not refer to any actually published proof of such duplication. I referred to the prospect of such duplication being exemplified in the immediate future; and, in consequence of the remarks made in the course of the discussion, I resolved that, so far as I was myself concerned, such duplication should not take place.

I remain,

Yours faithfully,

J. E. SANDYS.

Cambridge, August 13, 1910.

To the Editor of THE CLASSICAL REVIEW.

SIR,—I thank Dr. Sandys for his explanation, and I am glad to find that he does not suggest that there has been any breach of the pledge given on behalf of the editors of the two journals on the first page of the new *Classical Review* (February 1907) that 'no books will be reviewed in both.' But I think that his meaning would have been better expressed by saying 'may possibly get' the review instead of the 'will get' which he used.

J. P. POSTGATE.

Liverpool, August 21, 1910.

CALVERLEY'S 'ODE TO TOBACCO.'

To the Editor of THE CLASSICAL REVIEW.

I have read with much pleasure the Latin lyrical version of Calverley's 'Ode to Tobacco' which my friend Mr. Tyrrell has published in the last number of the *Classical Review*. It is therefore in no carping spirit that I note in it a small but inveterate error, the employment of *forte* with the sense of *fortasse*. This usage, which belongs to late Latin, is to be found, I know, in the Latin writings of many great scholars from the time of the revival of learning until now. My old private tutor, Richard Shilleto, used to impress on the memories of his pupils the difference between the two words by telling them a story. William Paley (the author of the *Evidences*) was reciting in the Senate House a Latin essay which had won for him the Members' Prize. He chanced to pronounce the word *pröfägus* as though it were *pröfägus*. A friend wrote down a couplet in Latin and sent it to Paley. It ran thus:

'Italiam fato profugus Laviniaque venit—'
Errat Virgilius: forte profugus erat.

Paley rejoined that the mistake of his friend in writing *forte* for *fortasse* was the worse of the two.

It would be well also to write *insanientes* for *vesanientes* in the sixth stanza.

J. S. R.

VERSIONS AND TRANSLATIONS

HONOUR the happy dead with sober praise,
Who living would have scorned the fulsome
phrase,

Meet for the languorous Orient's jewelled
ear.

This was the English king, that loved the
English ways;

A man not too remote, or too august,

For other mortal children of the dust

To know and to draw near.

Born with a nature that demanded joy,

He took full draughts of life, nor did the
vintage cloy;

But when she passed from vision, who so
long

Had sat aloft—alone—

On the steep heights of an Imperial throne,

Then rose he large and strong,

Then spake his voice with new and grander
tone,

Then called to rule the State

Which he had only served,

στρ. Ἐνδίκῳι σε χρὴ μάκαρ' ἄνδρα λόγῳι,
Μοῖσα, θρηνεῖν, ἄδῃν ὃς ἀβροδιαίτων
βαρβάρων τρητοῖς λοβοῖς
ζῶων ἔτι κ' αἶνον ἀπὸ
τὸν περιώσιον ἐ-
στρέφετ' Ἀγγλος ἀνὴρ, ἀ-
στῶν τρόποις τ' οὐ τοι συνοικήτωρ ἀέκων
καίπερ ἄρχων ἄστεος· οὐ
τρώμεον κείνον λίαν
χωρὶς ἐόν τι σέβας,
οἴχνεον δ' εὐγνωστον ἀνθρώπου ποτὶ
λῆμα φιλόφρονος οὐδ' ἀλλοῖον αὐτῶν.

ἀντ. τὸν ποθεινὰ μὲν λάχεν εὐφροσύνα,
οὐδ', ὃν ἀνθρώποισι δόσαν φίλιον ζω-
ᾶς ἄωτον δαίμονες
πίνειν, ἀπανάναθ' ὄγε,
τερπομένῳ δὲ χρόνος
κόρον οὐδέν' ἔχων χώ-
ρει προπομπός. τᾶς δ' ἐπεὶ κλειτᾶν
πολίῳν
οὐκ ἔτ' ὀφθαλμοὶ τύχον εὐ-
ρυμεδοῖσας ματέρος
ἐνθα πάλαι κράτεος
οἰόφρον νόμα γέρας ὑψιθρόνου,
δὴ τόκα λαμπρᾷ ἐπαντίλαις τύ γ' ὠχί.

ἐπ. φαίνες, ὦ Νικαφορίδα, νεαρὸν
τεὸν τυράννον χρῖσσεσκάπτρον στόμα.
ἄλλοτ' ἄλλ' ἐχρῆν σε παθεῖν.
τόκα μὲν λαῷ θεὸς
στᾶσε γενναῖον θεράποντα, τόκ' αὖτε
ἀρχέπολιν μετέμειψ'. ἄλλ',
οὐ γὰρ ἔφριξεν τόσα

He saw clear Duty plain, nor from that
highway swerved,

And, unappalled by his majestic fate,
Pretended not to greatness, yet was great.

WILLIAM WATSON: *Sable and Purple*.

μοῖρ' ἐπιούσά σ' ἀφυκτος,
εὖ ἰδὼν τὰν ἀνδράσιν
ἰθυφρόνεσσιν ἀρίγνω-
τον προπάροιθεν ὁδὸν,
τεὰν ἔλας ἀρχὰν σοφδς ἐν-
τὸς ἔχων. πολλοὶ δόκησάν
τινες εἶναι· ἐν' ἔγνω,
τῷ λαθόν γ' ἦλθε κλέος.

J. M. EDMONDS.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Publishers and Authors forwarding books for review are asked to send at the same time a note of the price.

. *Excerpts and Extracts from Periodicals and Collections are not included in these Lists unless stated to be separately published.*

Allardyce (R. M.) *Arnold's New Latin Course*. 7" × 4½". Part I., pp. viii + 117; cloth, 1s. 6d. Part II., pp. viii + 216; cloth, 2s. 6d. London: Edward Arnold, 1910.

Aristotle. *De Generatione Animalium*. Translated into English by A. Platt. Oxford University Press. 1910. 9" × 5½". Pp. viii + 715-790. 7s. 6d. net.

Butler (A. J.) *The Forerunners of Dante*. A selection from Italian poetry before 1300. Oxford University Press. 1910. 7½" × 5". Pp. xxxvi + 263. Cloth, 6s. net.

Frothingham (A. L.) *Roman Cities in Italy and Dalmatia*. With 61 full-page plates. London: John Murray. 1910. 8½" × 5½". Pp. xix + 343. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net.

Gercke (A.) und *Norden* (E.) *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft*. II Band, Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1910. 10" × 7". Pp. vii + 432. M. 9.

Horace. Part II., *Satires*. Erklärt von Adolf Kiessling. Berlin: Weidmann, 1910. 8" × 5". Pp. xxxiii + 300. M. 3.

Möller (C. R.) *De Photii Petrique Siculi libris contra Manichaeos scriptis*. Bonn: C. Georgi Typographi Academici. 1910. 5½" × 8½". Pp. 64.

Müller (Dietrich) *Die Ilias und ihre Quellen*. Berlin: Weidmann. 1910. 9" × 6". Pp. 372. M. 10.

Sophocles. *Oedipus Tyrannus*. Erklärt von F. W. Schneidewin und A. Nauck. Berlin: Weidmann. 1910. 8" × 5". Pp. 238. M. 2 20.

Storr (R.) *Concordance to De Imitatione Christi*. Oxford University Press. 1910. 9" × 5½". Pp. xvi + 600. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net.

The Monist: a Quarterly Magazine. Vol. XX., Part 3. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co. 1910. 6½" × 9½". Pp. 321-480. 60 cents. Yearly \$2.

FAULTS ESCAPED.—Mr. Todd corrects the following in his review of Friedländer's *Roman Life and Manners: Classical Review*, p. 123², 5 inf., 'of Italy' for of 'Italy'; 124² 9, idea for ideal. In the Note on Plautus: 120² 11 inf, huic for hinc; 121² 4, exercitatio for exercitatio.